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Roy Jenne
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ON THE BRINK

The Dramatic, Behind-the-Scenes Saga of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War

Years covered: about 1965–1995

By JAY WINIK

Simon & Schuster


Book 672 pages
Published 1996

Reagan's term
Jan 1981 to Jan 1989

Win the Cold War

The Cold War

Winning the Cold War

 Winning the Cold War
The neo-conservatives became 

Reagan Democrats.

They also felt the Democratic party prized freedom abroad. FDR took on Hitler, and Truman, later to be followed by Kennedy, would articulate sweeping doctrines to support those struggling for freedom around the world. Kennedy put it well, writing shortly before his death, “We are the watchmen of the walls of world freedom.” For those who had lost family in the fires of the Holocaust, or whose families were the victims of oppression in czarist and then Communist Russia, and in Eastern Europe, freedom mattered. This is what the liberalism of the Democratic party meant to them: merit and equal opportunity at home, freedom abroad. Thus, it was no surprise that, unlike the establishment, their own background led them to feel strongly about being Democrats. On a deeper level, liberalism and the Democratic party were about more than ideology, they were a part of their very identity. That’s how it had always been.

CDM is “Coalition for a Democratic Majority”

In 1972, one month after George McGovern’s forty-nine-state election loss to Richard Nixon, CDM assembled with a breathless sense of urgency. In his bid for the presidency, McGovern, a former political science professor and the son of a preacher, locked horns with the backroom bosses and boardroom figures of the mainstream Democratic party and gave voice to the reformers and the college-educated, antiwar movement. This new movement, quickly dubbed the New Left, or McGovernism, rebuffed the traditions of the Democratic party center, which had long adhered to internationalist ideals and supported containing Soviet power.

Many party elders had bristled at McGovern’s embrace of the strident, antwar, and often anti-American message of the New Left. This was, as Harvard professor Steven Kelman noted, a movement that derided America, not celebrated it. The young reformers cheered, not for American soldiers but for Mao, Ho Chi Minh, and the Vietcong. The New Left praised the Arab Liberation Movement, criticized the Czech reformers for opening up contacts with Western Imperialism, and glorified the brave North Vietnamese infantryman heading off to battle.
About this book: On the Brink
(1988)
A view of US politics and the world, about 1965-1995
- The Reagan presidency (Jan 1981 - Jan 1989)
- Winning the cold war, Kennedy

1) Presidents FDR, Truman, John Kennedy, and Johnson knew that we needed to fight for freedom abroad.
   - But from about 1968 on, a bunch of democrats (new left) became demonstrators, anti-war, peace movement, do not challenge Russia, etc. They ensured that the US lost the Vietnam war followed by "boat people escaping from S. Vietnam, 1.8 to 2.2 million deaths in Cambodia, etc.

   The Neo-Conservative
   They were of the & Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, keeping Jackson wing, The Demo party had abandoned them,
   - They became Reagan democrats
   - They had some high position in the Reagan Admin
   - This book is all about them
   - Kissinger was one of them (a hero to me)
   - They supported Scamp Jackson for president in 1976 (but Carter won)

3) 1984: Power was going away from Weinberger & Perle
   - Enemies were rising (page 160)
   - But they kept their influence
     - Shultz, Sec of State, see p. 328 & 6/16 in book
     - Berlin Wall Falls Nov 9, 1989 (Reagan "tear down the wall speech was June 1987), p. 595-596
     - President George Bush I (page 598), 1989-1993
     - East Europe, Margaret Thatcher (at), page 620
George McGovern shared these views and dreams of an idealistic universe where America carried out its foreign policy with spades and shovels, not guns. At an antiwar rally on the Boston Common on October 15, 1969, McGovern, his smooth forehead glistening in the sun, earnestly told 100,000 protesters, a number of them taking the day off from their studies at Harvard, that "America must withdraw to save her honor."

So in 1972, CDM was founded to wrest the party back to center, away from the isolationism of the New Left and back to the muscular foreign policy of Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and even Johnson. Smarting from the takeover of the Democratic party, Norman Podhoretz, the influential editor of Commentary magazine, his wife and noted author, Midge Decter, and Ben Wattenberg, a former Johnson White House speechwriter and political scientist who had penned some of Johnson's most fiery rhetoric, wrestled with a draft paper for this fledgling organization.

Amid Podhoretz's book-strewn apartment on the Upper West Side of Manhattan and over cups of rich black coffee, they talked about their mission as dusk fell over the New York skyline. The Democratic party had deserted them, ousted them and their ideas, told them that people of their views "need not apply." But they had not left the party, the party had left them.

They decided they would issue a manifesto. Working on a draft already scribbled by Decter, they massaged it until it was in final form. To counter McGovern's theme of "Come home, America," they wrote "Come home, Democrats," and called for "progress, freedom and security."

Scoop Jackson became the group's honorary co-chairman. For Jackson, the group would become an intellectual clearinghouse outside of government that would promote his views and his agenda in the domain of ideas. Hubert Humphrey was slated to be the other co-chairman.

"Senator, perhaps you should sleep on this."

Humphrey looked puzzled. His aide went on to talk about the perils of this group making Humphrey look like a conservative, which wouldn't sit very well with the growing liberal wing of the party. Much to Wattenberg's chagrin, and Jackson's disappointment, Humphrey declined to join. So Jackson, as was so often the case, went it alone, even offering his fundraising lists, which included such Democratic party heavy hitters as Alexander's Robin Farkus; Harriet Zimmerman of the United Jewish Ap-
CDM operated less as a formal organization than as a clearinghouse of ideas and as a haven for hard-line intellectuals, whose view of the world saw halting Soviet expansionism and reversing the decline in American power as their first priority. One member, Jeane Kirkpatrick, would often say, "We are a state of mind." The group lived by the words "Ideas have consequences."

In bringing together like-minded individuals, many of them former radicals and ex-socialists, most of them Jewish, through its conferences, published articles, and relentless political action, CDM rapidly established itself as a formidable Washington presence and as a counterweight to the New Left. Meanwhile, the more refined establishment.

Alexis de Tocqueville was the first to note that it was the political theorists, not the princes, ministers, or lords, who were the shapers of events leading to the French Revolution, and it was the neoconservatives loosely clustered around Jackson who were now seeking a new revolution in foreign policy. By the midpoint of the decade, Newsweek reported a seismic shift in the intellectual climate of the country: "In intellectual circles, the social thinkers who were once the driving force of Democratic liberalism—men like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and John Kenneth Galbraith—have been upstaged by a group of 'neoconservative' academics, many of them refugees from the liberal left."

CDM supported Jackson's bid for the presidency in 1976. After skipping the Iowa and New Hampshire primaries, the well-financed campaign got off to a good start. Jackson won the Massachusetts primary and made a strong showing in Florida. In a burst of excitement, Jackson told his people, "We now go on to a landslide in New York." Jackson did win New York, courting pro-Israel Jewish supporters and getting 38 percent of the vote, while it was not a landslide, and his campaign fell victim to the media expectations game. Scoop all but ceased campaigning for the nomination after being drubbed in Pennsylvania, eventually tossing his support to the governor from Georgia. He refused to join in the "stop Carter" attempts by the McGovernites, Representative Mo Udall and Senator Frank Church, who bitterly contested Carter to the very end.

At first, the neoconservatives thought Carter, a former naval officer who went before the platform committee of the Democratic party and declared that détente had been "exploited by the Soviet Union," would be an improvement over the policies of weakness that they felt had characterized Nixon's and Ford's administrations. But their hopes were soon dashed as Carter began assembling his foreign policy team. -- end of a chapter in book ---
But, as the 1970s were drawing to a close, conversation always came back to old questions of geopolitics: what to do about the Soviets?

“She was going through a prolonged mental process of sorting things out,” one friend, watching the inner workings of Kirkpatrick, noted.

Some of that sorting had become clear two months earlier, when she fired off a withering blast at Carter in the November issue of *Commentary*. The *Commentary* article was a watershed piece for Kirkpatrick, professionally and personally. It reflected her own struggle with her identity as a Democrat, and her increasingly gloomy assessment of world events.

In the tightly reasoned essay, called “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Kirkpatrick argued that there was a distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Moderate autocratic regimes of the right tend to be less repressive than Communist regimes of the left, she wrote, and “more compatible with U.S. security interests.” For example, she asked rhetorically: “How can an administration committed to nonintervention in Cambodia and Vietnam announce that it will not be deterred from righting wrongs in South Africa?” To this she added, “A realistic policy which aims at protecting our own interests and assisting the capacity for self-determination of less-developed nations will need to face the unpleasant fact that, if victorious, violent insurgency headed by Marxist revolutionaries is unlikely to lead to anything but totalitarian tyranny.”

Boiled down to its essence, the message was fairly straightforward and accurate. *Jimmy Carter* was, in Kirkpatrick’s view, no less than a willing accomplice, if not a midwife, to efforts that brought to power the Sandinista Communists in Nicaragua and the fundamentalist Khomeini regime in Iran. Both were more hostile to America than their unruly predecessors. They were, she contended, even more dictatorial than the pro-American regimes of Anastasio Somoza and the shah, and, under the shadow of the Soviet Union, not as likely to democratize.

Finally, in a slap at the reluctance of the Carter administration to use sufficient force abroad, she warned against U.S. administrations that
Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson, Democrat of Washington, one of the quiet giants in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union, fought against the belligerent policies of Republicans and Democrats alike. He never achieved his goal of becoming president, but his devoted following of "Scoop Jackson Democrats" would attain leading positions in the Reagan administration.

The brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to widespread fears about a changing global balance of power and shocked the conscience of the world. It ended the policy of detente. But the question remained: how to deal with the Soviets.
On February 9, 1984, Soviet leader Yuri Andropov died, after only sixteen months as general secretary, and was replaced by Konstantin Chernenko. Like Andropov and Brezhnev before him, Chernenko was a dogmatic Communist party elder, and was also sickly. Nonetheless, Reagan quietly exchanged a number of private letters with the new general secretary to explore the possibility of a summit conference. Chernenko was cool to the idea, but his letters and exchanges also revealed something else, that the aging Soviet leader was fixated on SDI—even demanding that the U.S. stop work on the system.

Reagan's feelings to the Soviets, however, raised a new question closer to home: where did Richard Perle, the administration's most prominent actor in arms control, fit in?

Initially, the picture did not look good. If Richard Perle had been an architect of the first term's policies, signs now indicated that his influence could be on the wane, and even raised the distinct possibility that his ouster was in the works.

That year, Time correspondent Strobe Talbott published an inside account of the arms talks, Deadly Gambits, that portrayed in relentless detail bitter administration infighting. Despite the alarmist tone (it spoke of the end of arms control), demonstrable Soviet sympathy (it portrayed Soviet fears far more than American), and an unseemly condescending

And the book's unmistakable villain, the Rasputin systematically sabotaging arms control, even more than Caspar Weinberger, was Richard Perle. So on October 14, 1984, in the Reagan-Mondale debate on foreign policy, when Mondale cited the book before the television cameras, it was a sign of trouble for Perle.

But in truth, some early signs existed that Perle was already being cut out of the process. On September 27-28, Gromyko visited the president and then the State Department. Perle was omitted from the meetings.
Over the next week, Perle's enemies circled and the anti-Perle rumor mill shifted into high gear, leaking that the White House would like to see Perle go. Leslie Gelb, writing in the New York Times, gave life to the story, speculating that Perle, "universally recognized as the intellectual and bureaucratic leader" of the "anti-arms control cabal," would have to be dumped.

Still, it was unlikely that Weinberger would ask Perle to go unless directly ordered to do so by the president. Thus, Perle could reason that he was safe as long as Weinberger was defense secretary. But this too, it briefly seemed, was tenuous.

On November 15, amid talk that Shultz was fed up feuding with the Pentagon, the secretary of state met with Jim Baker, the White House chief of staff. Tall, a ruthless pragmatist and remarkably effective, Baker was no fan of Weinberger's or Perle's; he was also masterful at manipulating the system. Even the squint of his eyes was imposing.

It thus came as significant news when Baker confidently assured Shultz: "The president will deal with the problem." Lowering his drawling voice just slightly, Baker's eyes darted about and he informed Shultz that two new ambassadorial appointments would be made: Jeane Kirkpatrick would go to Paris, and Weinberger to London.

Which meant that Perle would be a sitting duck.

Moscow was desperate to stop SDI - true

On November 17, desperate to stop SDI, the Kremlin proposed a new round of arms talks, and on Thanksgiving, a year after the talks broke off over the INF deployments, Moscow and Washington agreed that Shultz and Gromyko would meet in Geneva on January 7 and 8 toward this end.

Perle writes important memo

As word spread of the NItze appointment, Perle, his gaze fixed, weighed the situation. The signs were demonstrably clear, and he knew that the balance of bureaucratic power was shifting in the government, away from him and Weinberger toward Shultz and NItze. This was hardly good news, and, after nearly four years of holding his finger in the dike, he feared a precipitous rush toward concluding an abrupt arms deal. Once the talks got under way, they would, he worried, take on their own momentum—as had always happened in the past. Unlike others in government, he trusted Ronald Reagan's instincts completely. But it wasn't that simple. For one thing, he worried that Reagan was not always getting straight information.

He sat down with a yellow pad and pen and began to make some notes. He wanted to frame his thoughts for a memo to Weinberger.

He wrote:

Significant Pressure to Do the Wrong Thing:

But things happened - Perle stayed in power
Was he passionate like Reagan? One got few easy clues from Shultz himself. More often than not, his only tell-all response in conversation would be an arched brow, a mild frown, an angry scowl or stare, or an occasional smile. But even these were rare.

His supporters were nevertheless adamant that Shultz was a man of strong beliefs. Though an intellectual (he saw himself this way as well), it was said that he was not a Henry Kissinger, a bold strategist, weaving disparate strands of thought into a coherent conceptual cloth. But, by his deeds and actions, it was clear Shultz was deeply committed to spreading democracy abroad and strongly anti-Communist, no less so than the president for whom he worked. And like Ronald Reagan, he was a man of vision, looking beyond the day-to-day to the more awesome task of harnessing the forces of history to the service of American security and the democratic peace.

As for regional conflicts, to Shultz, they mattered in the great global chess game against the Soviets: in Afghanistan, the mujahadeen were “freedom fighters”; in Nicaragua, democracy had to be reclaimed and the contras supported; in El Salvador, he wanted to strengthen the democratic center, which meant standing tough both against the radical right and against the Marxist left. Then there was the issue of human rights, the one area where the normally stoic Shultz showed a warm flicker of emotion, perhaps never more so than when talking with Jewish refusniks in the Soviet Union. As for the Soviets themselves, he felt they were an expansionist, cruel regime—even as he creatively sought ways to work with them, to tutor them in the benefits of open societies, to make them a little less dangerous, a little less Communist, a little more like the U.S.

By training and temperament, this Quaker descendant, reared as an Episcopalian, was a born negotiator. A graduate of Princeton, he had a doctorate in industrial economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, specializing more in labor negotiations than economic theory per se. Besides teaching, one of his first passions and pursuits after graduation was as a labor-management negotiator. Since then, he had racked up a stunning array of credentials, spanning government, business, and academia, before becoming Reagan’s secretary of state.
The Reagan era came to an end much the way it began: with a breathtaking revolution against an old and decrepit order.

Its formal end was not marked by the moment when Ronald Reagan gripped his wife's hand on a cold wintry afternoon in January of 1989, congratulated his successor, George Bush, gave one last wave, and bid farewell to return to his beloved California ranch. Rather, it came eleven months later, on November 9, 1989, the day when the Berlin Wall fell, symbolizing the toppling of brutal Communist regimes from Budapest to Prague and Cracow to Tbilisi, as the Cold War came to a stunning close, and a continent cheered.

But as word of the revolution seeped into the inner sanctums of the Washington establishment, the reaction was at first oddly restrained. No one had foreseen, let alone even dreamed of, such a remarkable event. The new Bush White House moved cautiously.

Discussions in the paneled chambers of the Harold Pratt House, the inner sanctum of the Council on Foreign Relations, were marked by a comparable temperance. It was a "set of events to be managed," most assembled concluded, the poetry of the moment almost completely lost amid the drone of the foreign policy technocracy.

For the prophets of détente and for die-hard doves, the event had a jarring, even uncomfortable, ring to it. The euphoria of the young people madly chipping away at the Berlin Wall, smashing its concrete, and dancing ecstatically on its crumbling remains, stood in stark contrast to those in the West who had for years preached coexistence with the Communist world, long sounding alarms at Reagan's tough talk against the Soviets, warning that it signaled another "menacing round in the escalating arms race."

But this was not what happened.

The reverberations of the collapse were almost without precedent. Not a single shot had been sounded. Instead, it was the sweet music of democracy that had lifted the Iron Curtain of Communist repression. A
transformation of unbelievable proportions was taking place. The long
hand of history had been reversed in one decade, and the dreary pes-
simism of the 1970s had given way to the democratic aspirations of burly
dockworkers, avant-garde writers, former apparatchiks, and a legion of
other heroes, who had silently braved the gulag, outlived the work pris-
ons, outsmarted the secret police, and, blustery winter after winter, had
never lost faith that, at some point, their destiny would once again be
theirs.

Speaking from his stark, crudely paneled office in Gdansk, the framed
symbol of Solidarity watching from the wall, Lech Walesa, clad in a
short-sleeved white shirt, his beefy hands flying as he spoke, would boister-
erously tell how Ronald Reagan and his policies "gave strength and
sustenance" to his people, and "helped defeat the Communists." The
supporters of the Czech Velvet Revolution that produced Václav Havel,
looking more like beatniks with corduroys and thick black glasses than
slayers of the Red Army, would echo Solidarity, as would countless other
dissident movements throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

As the fading remnants of a decadent and evil order were being quickly
swept away, the future was now theirs. And ultimately, even as they
heaped much deserved credit on Ronald Reagan, so was the revolution.

Now on the outside, Reagan and his people were perhaps equally sur-
prised by the suddenness of Communism’s collapse. But it was an out-
come that they had not just dreamed about, but also assiduously and
deliberately worked toward since the start of his administration. Even in
the quiet satisfaction of his final days, Reagan remained a staunch pro-
ponent of the worldwide democratic revolution he had proclaimed in
1982.

When in June 1987 the seventy-six-year-old Ronald Reagan stood
erect at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, and challenged, “General Secre-
tary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity . . . come here
to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down
this wall!” his detractors immediately wrote this off as another dan-
gerous example of his “simplistic rhetoric of confrontation.” They were
wrong. In preaching the language of freedom, Ronald Reagan was seek-
ing to keep in motion an unshakable chain of events and energies that
would lead to the inexorable demise of the socialist system.

In May 1988, during his final summit with Gorbachev, in Moscow,
Reagan praised the positive changes that Gorbachev had instituted, de-
claring the “evil empire” a relic of “another time, another era.” But once
again, the president, although physically less steady than he used to be,
was unyielding in his insistence on greater individual freedom and more democracy. Speaking a language that he hoped would touch the atavistic stirrings of the Russian soul, Reagan quoted the Russian poet Pushkin to Gorbachev. In a reassuring but firm voice, he urged continued change, saying, "It's time my friend, it's time. The heart begs for peace, the days fly past. It's time, my friend, it's time."

Gorbachev had long since learned his lesson and knew better than to quarrel with Reagan. Since Reykjavik, he saw that what Reagan said, he meant. And he knew that Reagan was both a fighter and a peacemaker.

After strolling through Red Square, when formalities were again about to begin, and after the two men had the very last of their disagreements, over a communiqué, Gorbachev decided not to quibble with the president. The old rivalry between these two great leaders was now a friendship. The younger Soviet leader, who like Reagan was ready to take his own place in history, instead smiled, wrapped his right arm around Reagan in a warm clasp, and said of their last summit, "Mr. President, we had a great time."

Eighteen months later, with the quiet lighting of 100,000 candles in Wenceslas Square, the toppling of a wall, and the eventual counting of Russian ballot boxes, the Cold War had drawn to a close.

100,000 candles

Amazing how it all came together. Explanations will be pored over and debated by historians for decades to come, but invariably they will say this: Under Ronald Reagan, everywhere the Soviets had turned, their pressure was met by U.S. counterpressure. Where the Soviets had supported Marxist-guerrilla movements, their imperial gains were checked and reversed by U.S.-backed anti-Communist groups; where they had blustered that "History is on our side," the U.S. rocked the very conceptual foundations of their empire with robust ideological warfare in defense of democracy; and where the Soviets had deployed their missiles, the U.S. refused to back down and firmly put its missiles into place. The INF deployment was the first crossroads at which a then precarious Cold War decisively turned. The Soviets were never again the same, although this was just the beginning. Eventually, when they could no longer compete, not militarily, not politically, not ideologically, not economically, in one last desperate attempt, Gorbachev sought to reverse the tide, at Reykjavik. He did not succeed. But this historic event at Iceland had its own epiphany. Rather than simply back the wounded bear into the corner, Reagan made it clear to Gorbachev that the U.S. stood not just for freedom, not simply for strength and principle, but also for peace. The Soviets saw the inevitable, and then took the only feasible door left open to them, and, in turn, they too chose peace, even at the price of dismantling themselves. And so it happened, the beginning of the end, and then the end itself.
Yet amidst the astonishment of one old order being replaced overseas, at home, another old order had once again reestablished itself. Ronald Reagan's counterestablishment was not welcome in President George Bush's administration. Bush filled his ranks primarily with Eastern establishment Republicans, who shared little of the optimism, the can-do spirit, or the sense of destiny that had galvanized the counterestablishment.

After eight years of gripping the capital and the world, after fighting and winning the Cold War, Reaganism and the counterestablishment were not just relegated to the back bench, they weren't even members of the team.

On issue after issue after issue, Bush, like Reagan before him, would confront a bitterly partisan Congress. But there was a huge difference. Reagan was a big-tent man, standing less for partisanship and more for his philosophy of smaller government, greater individual freedom, and a dominant American leadership role in the world. Shining stars in his administration were not just men like George Shultz or Cap Weinberger, but could be Democrats, like a Jeane Kirkpatrick or a Richard Perle. His most cherished policies, like human rights or Central America, could fall into the hands of a Max Kampelman, the consummate hard-line negotiator, or an Elliott Abrams, a dedicated and tenacious defender of the Reagan Doctrine. Reagan's was an administration founded on principle, not political party, and was dedicated less to getting along than to getting the job done.

Bush was different. A skilled and extraordinarily decent public servant, and a most seasoned foreign policy pro of the old school, he did remain a partisan—but as a quintessential member of the Washington establishment, he was also a ready compromiser with Congress. If Bush wanted one thing—though he rarely got it—it was to cooperate with the Democratic barons on the Hill, and there was little place for the counterestablishment's intense style of policy making in the more refined, more upper-crust Bush administration. (The most notable exception was Bush's defense secretary, Dick Cheney, the calm, measured Wyoming congressman. He was gutsy and extraordinarily capable, a man of leadership, sound common sense and a clear head, and a true Reaganaught. Another exception was Defense Undersecretary Paul Wolfowitz.)

Shunned by the Bush people, damned by the Democrats, the counterestablishment had to be content to make their voices heard from their think tank warrens, on the op-ed pages, and in policy conferences around Washington. For the most part, after eight years of being in the spotlight, they quietly receded into the background, as though biding their time.
AND THEN THERE WERE the secretaries, George Shultz, the diplomat, and Caspar Weinberger, the warrior. As the decade of the 1990s neared its midpoint, both men continued to probe the great philosophical questions of the Cold War. What happened? How? Why? George Shultz’s memoirs, comprehensive and engaging, had been written, but he still had much to say. Shultz scoffed at those who suggested that the Cold War’s outcome was preordained or was the result of inevitable Soviet weakness. “Utter nonsense,” he replied. To Shultz, like Weinberger, the Cold War had been a life-or-death struggle, a fierce contest between two radically different political systems, with the final outcome uncertain. Before Ronald Reagan, he noted, the U.S. “was in terrible shape: psychologically, militarily, economically.” And, he would firmly remind others, in 1980 and for most of the decade, the Soviets “had a very profound military machine.”

From his perch back home in California, there remained little doubt in Shultz’s mind that the U.S. actions in the Reagan era—“standing firm in Central America and Afghanistan,” “leading the NATO alliance,” “getting the American people to think realistically about the Soviet [empire],” “supporting democracy worldwide,” “the U.S. military buildup,” and, “most of all the INF deployment” and the two key summits at “Geneva and Reykjavik”—created the environment that led the Soviets to implode and the U.S. to win the Cold War. However tumultuous a time it was, these years left a record of which he was personally proud.

Indeed, with each passing year, Shultz’s own stature as a statesman continued to grow. Ever a consummate pragmatist, and not an effusive man, like other leading Reaganauts, he too was grieved by the human drama of Bosnia and the appallingly weak American response. Now on the outside, he was surprisingly blunt in his assessment of America’s conduct of world affairs under Clinton. These are amateurish people, he pointed out, whom he saw as “products of the Vietnam era,” and “almost anti-U.S.” in their orientation. Not a man prone to overstatement or hyperbole, the former secretary watched events in Washington with a mounting sense of dread, worrying about the steady erosion of American leadership and failure to shape the emerging post–Cold War world. He believed, as well, that America needed SDI. Shultz, however, took solace in the 1994 elections, seeing, like Kirkpatrick, the Republican congressional victory as a continuation at home of what Ronald Reagan had accomplished abroad.

He spoke the commonsense language of its towns and its everyday citizens. His life was the very definition of the dream that any child from any background can grow up to become America’s president.

In office, Reagan had a self-assured style. He refused to get bogged down in unnecessary clutter, he stuck to his fundamental beliefs, he didn’t compromise lightly, he inspired the allies as well as individual citizens the world over, and he was effective with Congress. His inner reserve of optimism was quintessentially American.

Yet, while critics erroneously deride his “simplicity” and his “faults,” Ronald Reagan remains inordinately complex and his policies unusually nuanced. He had the guts of a Harry Truman, the rousing charisma and far-reaching vision of an FDR, a brain trust of intellectuals who more than rivaled that of JFK. He could work with a hostile Congress: where LBJ bullied members, Reagan charmed them. In foreign policy, he knew when to use strength and when to extend a hand to an enemy. He did not want America to retreat to the safety of the oceans; he wanted to remake the world.

Always, Reagan carried with him a faith in the greatness of his nation. But, for all this, Reagan was a humble man. After his final summit with Gorbachev, he modestly joked, he felt as though he had “dropped in to a grand historical moment.” Yet this moment, like so many others, was in many ways of his making.

Reagan’s victory changed the course of history. By the fearful year of 1980, the country had lost faith in itself, its ideals, its underpinnings. It cannot be forgotten how day in and day out, for over four decades, the lives of all Americans, and indeed the world, were consumed with one central, overarching issue, the Soviets and the Cold War. In Eastern Europe, half a continent was enslaved; for its part, the free world lived uneasily in a time shaped by images of mushroom clouds, fallout shelters, and children ducking under school desks in mock drills. Every other issue, from such crucial matters as domestic race relations to the health of the economy, was inevitably and inexorably dwarfed by the most urgent of all concerns, peace and war. Had the Cold War been resolved differently, or not at all, as was entirely possible given the state of the world in the 1970s, history would have had a much uglier, more unimaginable face. Yet Reagan and his people, men and women like George Shultz, Cap Weinberger, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle, Max Kampelman, and Elliott Abrams, changed that.

Despite repeated criticism from the legions inside Washington, they forced a reticent nation not simply to face up to its global obligations in the tensest of times, but also to its historic commitment to democracy. True, they did not win the Cold War solely on their own. It was also a vic-
tory for those brave, nameless people who, generation after generation, struggled against Communism in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, and in conflicts stretching from Asia to Africa to the Americas. Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, who came to realize that further conflict was futile, also will find their way onto the register of history. And Margaret Thatcher, the British prime minister, was an indispensable ally, a brave leader helping keep NATO's knees firm where they otherwise might have buckled. But, ultimately, the vision and the triumph decisively belong to Reagan and his counterestablishment.

RONALD REAGAN, THIS larger-than-life man, who embodied at his very core the human aspirations of Americans in every era, will be remembered by history as one of America's greatest presidents and his administration as one of the most historic. It will be commonplace to mention his name in the same breath as those of Washington, Lincoln, FDR, Truman, and Kennedy. And just as FDR and Kennedy inspired generations of Democrats, so Reagan's legacy will inspire generations of conservatives. It has in fact already done so.

Ironically, today, Ronald Reagan the conservative now looms as one of the twentieth century's great revolutionaries. In championing a movement away from statism, bureaucracy, and centralization, toward individual freedom, entrepreneurship, and democracy, he propounded a vision rooted in this country's heritage, one that appeals to the grandest hopes of Americans, not to their fears; to their confidence, not to their doubts. It is a vision, at once powerful and profound, that has increasingly found roots around the world.

And it was the loyal members of Ronald Reagan's administration, the counterestablishment, empowered by a shared sense of duty and common philosophy, who found the will to change the world. They took over at a fearful time when the globe was mercilessly divided between East and West, frequently hovering at the brink, and Soviet power, not democracy, was on the rise. In the end, they preserved the West from totalitarianism and aggression and quite literally ushered in a new world, restoring the possibility of freedom and dignity throughout the globe.

Like all men and women, they had their weaknesses, but their common strengths were considerable, their achievements truly extraordinary. By fate, hard work, and solid determination, they rose to the immense task of leaving perhaps the finest legacy to the nation: bequeathing a period of relative global tranquillity, freed of the chronic threat of nuclear war, a time when liberty could flourish, a once tentative America no longer at risk.
The ‘Blame America First’ Crowd

President Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, died December 7. On Aug. 20, 1984, at the Republican National Convention in Dallas, she delivered one of the most memorable political speeches in American history. Here are excerpts from that speech:

I want to begin tonight by quoting the speech of a President whom I very greatly admire, Harry Truman, who once said to the Congress: “The United States has become great because we, as a people, have been able to work together for great objectives even while differing about details.”

He continued: “The elements of our strength are many. They include our democratic government, our economic system, our great natural resources. But the basic source of our strength is spiritual. We believe in the dignity of man.”

That’s the way Democratic Presidents and presidential candidates used to talk about America. These were the men who developed NATO, who developed the Marshall Plan, who devised the Alliance for Progress. They were not afraid to be resolute nor ashamed to speak of America as a great nation. They didn’t doubt that we must be strong enough to protect ourselves and help others. They didn’t imagine that America should depend for its very survival on the promises of its adversaries. They happily assumed the responsibilities of freedom.

San Francisco Democrats

I am not alone in noticing that the San Francisco Democrats took a very different approach.

A recent article in the New York Times noted “the foreign policy line that emerged from the Democratic National

nation? What would become of Mexico if Central America became a Soviet satellite?

What then could the United States do?

These are questions the San Francisco Democrats have not answered. These are questions they haven’t even asked.

Failed Carter Administration

The Carter Administration’s unilateral “restraint” in developing and deploying weapon systems was accompanied by an unprecedented Soviet buildup—military and political.

The Soviets, working on the margins and through the loopholes of SALT I, developed missiles of stunning speed and accuracy and targeted the cities of our friends in Europe. They produced weapons capable of wiping out our land-based missiles.

And then, feeling strong, the Soviet leaders moved with boldness and skill to exploit their new advantages.

Facilities were completed in Cuba during those years that permit Soviet nuclear submarines to roam our coasts, that permit planes to fly reconnaissance missions over the Eastern United States, and that permit Soviet electronic surveillance to monitor our telephone calls and our telegrams.

Those were the years the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Iran, while in Nicaragua the Sandanistas developed a one-party dictatorship based on the Cuban model.

From the fall of Saigon in 1975 until January 1981, Soviet influence expanded dramatically into Laos, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen, Libya, Syria, Aden, Congo, Madagascar, Seychelles, Nicaragua and Grenada.

Soviet bloc forces and advisers sought to guarantee what they called the “irreversibility” of their newfound influence and to stimulate the release of our hostages, signaled an end to the most humiliating episode in our national history. The inauguration of President Reagan signaled a reaffirmation of historic American ideals.

Ronald Reagan brought to the presidency confidence in the American experience, confidence in the legitimacy and success of American institutions, confidence in the decency of the American people and confidence in the relevance of our experience to the rest of the world. That confidence has proved contagious.

Our nation’s subsequent recovery in domestic and foreign affairs, the restoration of military and economic strength has silenced the talk of inevitable American decline and reminded the world of the advantages of freedom.

They said we could never deploy missiles to protect Europe’s cities. But today Europe’s cities enjoy that protection.

They said it would never be possible to hold an election in El Salvador because the people were too frightened and the country too disorganized. But the people of El Salvador proved them wrong, and today President Napoleon Duarte has impressed the democratic world with his skillful, principled leadership.

They said we could not use America’s strength to help others—Sudan, Chad, Central America, the Gulf states, the Caribbean nations—without being drawn into war. But we have helped others resist Soviet, Libyan, Cuban subversion, and we are at peace.

They said that saving Grenada from terror and totalitarianism was the wrong thing to do—they didn’t blame Cuba or the Communists for threatening American students and murdering Grenadians—they blamed the United States instead.

But then, somehow, they always blame America first.

When our Marines, sent to Lebanon on a multi-national peacekeeping mission with the consent of the United States Congress, were murdered in their sleep, the “blame America first crowd” didn’t blame the terrorists who murdered the Marines, they blamed the United States.

But then, they always blame America first.

When the Soviet Union walked out of arms control negotiations and refused even to discuss the issues, the San Francisco Democrats didn’t blame Soviet intransigence. They blamed the United States.

But then, they always blame America first.

When Marxist dictators shoot their way to power in Central America, the San Francisco Democrats don’t blame the guerrillas and their Soviet allies, they blame United States policies of 100 years ago.

But then, they always blame America first.

JEANE KIRKPATRICK told the country in 1984 that San Francisco Democrats wanted to “blame America first” for all the woes of the world.
That's the way Democratic Presidents and presidential candidates used to talk about America. These were the men who developed NATO, who developed the Marshall Plan, who devised the Alliance for Progress. They were not afraid to be resolute or ashamed to speak of America as a great nation. They didn't doubt that we must be strong enough to protect ourselves and to help others. They didn't imagine that America should depend for its very survival on the promises of its adversaries. They happily assumed the responsibilities of freedom.

San Francisco Democrats

I am not alone in noticing that the San Francisco Democrats took a very different approach.

A recent article in the New York Times noted that "the foreign policy line that emerged from the Democratic National Convention in San Francisco is a distinct shift from the policies of such Democratic Presidents as Harry S Truman, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson." I agree.

I shall speak tonight of foreign affairs, even though the other party's convention barely touched the subject.

When the San Francisco Democrats treated foreign affairs as an afterthought, as they did, they behaved less like a dove or a hawk than like an ostrich—convinced it could shut out the world by hiding its head in the sand.

Today, foreign policy is central to the security, to the freedom, to the prosperity, even to the survival of the United States.

And our strength, for which we make many sacrifices, is essential to the independence and freedom of our allies and our friends.

Ask yourself: What would become of Europe if the United States withdrew? What would become of Africa if Europe fell under Soviet domination? What would become of Europe if the Middle East came under Soviet control? What would become of Israel if surrounded by Soviet client states? What would become of Asia if the Philippines or Japan fell under Soviet domination?

Facilities were completed in Cuba during those years that permit Soviet nuclear submarines to roam our coasts, that permit planes to fly reconnaissance missions over the Eastern United States, and that permit Soviet electronic surveillance to monitor our telephone calls and our telegrams.

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Soviet bloc forces and advisers sought to guarantee what they called the "irreversibility" of their newfound influence and to stimulate insurgencies in a dozen other places.

During this period, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, murdered its president and began a ghastly war against the Afghan people.

The American people were shocked by these events. We were greatly surprised to learn of our diminished economic and military strength. We were demoralized by the treatment of our hostages in Iran. And we were outraged by harsh attacks on the United States in the United Nations.

As a result, we lost confidence in ourselves and in our government.

Jimmy Carter looked for an explanation for all these problems and thought he found it in the American people.

But the people knew better. It wasn't laissez faire we suffered from: It was Jimmy Carter—and Walter Mondale.

Election of Ronald Reagan

And so, in 1980, the American people elected a very different President.

The election of Ronald Reagan marked an end to the dismal period of retreat and decline. His inauguration, blessed by the simultaneous military and economic strength has silenced the talk of inevitable American decline and reminded the world of the advantages of freedom.

President Reagan faced a stunning challenge and he met it.

Since his inauguration, the United States has grown stronger, safer, more confident, and we are at peace.

The Reagan Administration has restored the American economy.

It is restoring our military strength. It has liberated the people of Grenada from terror and tyranny. With NATO, it has installed missiles to defend the cities of Europe.

The Reagan Administration has prevented the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations. It has developed flexible new forms of international cooperation with which to deal with new threats to world order.

The Reagan Administration has given more economic assistance to developing countries than any other administration or any other government, and has encouraged the economic freedom needed to promote self-sustaining economic growth.

The Reagan Administration has helped to sustain democracy and encourage its development elsewhere.

And at each step of the way, the same people who were responsible for America's
Kirkpatrick was U.N. ambassador in Reagan era

By Johanna Neuman
Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON — Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, a staunch Reagan-era anti-Communist who infused American foreign policy with firm conviction as the first woman to serve as U.N. ambassador, has died. She was 80.

Kirkpatrick died late Thursday in her sleep at her home in Bethesda, Md., according to an announcement Friday on the Web site of the American Enterprise Institute. The conservative think tank, where Kirkpatrick worked for several decades after she left office, called her “a great patriot and champion of freedom.”

After Kirkpatrick gained entry into the male purview of foreign policy, Madeleine Albright and Condoleezza Rice followed her. Secretary of State Rice on Friday called her a role model, “an academic who brought great intellectual power to her work.”

A political scientist who received a doctorate from Columbia University and studied at the Institut de Sciences Politiques in Paris — Kirkpatrick came to the attention of Ronald Reagan after writing an article for the neoconservative journal Commentary in 1979.

In February 1981, she went to New York as Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations, an institution she had little use for and compared to “death and taxes.” Eager to restore U.S. prowess in the wake of defeat in Vietnam and the capture of American diplomats as hostages in Iran, she vowed to do battle against Marxists, Communists and anyone else who mistook U.S. policy mistakes for weakness.

An icon to many conservatives, Kirkpatrick was for most of her life a Democrat. Her husband, Evron, head of the American Political Science Association, was an adviser to liberal Minnesota Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey. But she said later that they were “chronically dismayed” by the party’s drift toward the left after 1972.

After she resigned the U.N. post and left government in 1985, Kirkpatrick wrote widely and became an unexpected draw on the lecture circuit, earning enough to buy a house in France, where she enjoyed cooking, according to defense official and neoconservative Richard Perle.

Former United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, pictured in November 1990, died Thursday at 80. Kirkpatrick was a one-time Democrat who switched to the Republican Party and became a heroine of conservatives.

Dec 9, 2006

Daily Camera

Drum: Dems drift left

2-20

* She was a Democrat most of her life
* She became dismayed by bad Democratic policies
* She became a neo-conservative
* She joined the Reagan administration
* She was a hero to me — The US owes a debt to her — Roy Perne

But in 2007 the main US news hates neo-cons. Help!
Centralized Communist System Always Brought Atrocities

BY CHRISTOPHER BANES

Communist political prisons constitute a matter that has frequently been overlooked throughout recent history. That’s why Paul Hollander’s From the Gulag to the Killing Fields performs an important service by compiling various prison memoirs from such Communist states as China, North Korea, and Cuba.

While tales abound about the atrocities that have been carried out in these places, Hollander is one of the first to have ever consolidated his research to focus on how the highly flawed logic behind marxism consistently led to some of the most gruesome and systematic exterminations of human beings in the 20th Century.

One principal theme is that the Communist atrocity cases have been ignored by history, overshadowed by the other gruesome event of the 20th Century: the Nazi Holocaust. Hollander explains this lack of focus as being due to the differences in how crimes were carried out. The Nazis focused on the systematic extermination of a specific ethnic group and undertook great efforts to document what they did. On the other hand, the Communist systems did not focus on a particular ethnic group. Instead they focused on those characters who were deemed to be a threat. Often the criteria for what qualified as a threat was extremely vague, and intentionally so. Anna Larina, whose memoir, This I Cannot Forget, is part of the text, had the misfortune of being married to a revolutionary who fell victim to Stalin’s party purge in the 1930s.

Protecting the State

Everything was carried out in the name of state protection. Security agencies could make people vanish. People were taught not to question but accept blindly on faith. The stories, however, make it clear that the populace easily differentiated the rhetoric from the oppressive reality. Governments claimed that there would come a day when the lingering pieces of capitalism would finally be smitten and the people could theoretically rest in subsequent peace and happiness. These days never came, and it was evident to most that they never would. Kang Chol-Hwan notes how his family never left its North Korean prison camp. Reinaldo Arenas was eventually released from prison in Havana after signing a fictitious confession.

Contrary to the promises, the oppressive reality never left. Stalin himself warned against Communist societies’ relaxing viselike grips on society: “We must smash and throw out the rotten theory that with each forward movement we make, the class struggle will die down more and more. . . . This is not only a rotten theory, but a dangerous theory, for it lulls our people to sleep. . . . On the contrary, the more we move forward, the more success we have, then the more wrathful become the remnants of the beaten exploiter classes.”

It was logic such as this that assured the continuation of reigns of intimidation. One could never let down his guard lest the “remnants of capitalism” should attempt to rise up and oppress anew. Stalin came and left, and various leaders shuffled in and out of power over the decades as well, but the notion of Big Brother never left. Up until the 1980s in East Germany, the Stasi monitored citizens in any and every way it could. Tiny samples of dirty underwear were very discreetly kept on file so that dogs could quickly connect scents to opposition materials found abandoned on the street.

In the Name of ‘Progress’

The environment of oppression only created a part of the Communist atmosphere though. The other half was rooted in sheer brutality, hatred and the often inhumane living standards endured by citizens.

No Communist country ever developed into the promised utopia. Most countries suffered horribly in the name of “progress.” However, the atrocities committed in Cambodia possibly exceed all others in terms of their grotesqueness and barbarity. In efforts to allegedly free Cambodia from the entire international system, complete and total ataraxy was attempted, and anything from the outside world was deemed unnecessary and disrespectful of the Khmer Rouge. Even eyeglasses were deemed to be a sign of elitism and Westernization and were grounds for execution. Even more disturbing was the way pregnant women were haphazardly slaughtered, often without the formality of even a trumped-up charge. The only thing more disturbing is the manner in which, even nonchalant the perpetrators were in implementing them.

Given today’s international environment, the excerpts from Kang Chol-Hwan’s The Aquariums of Pyongyang arguably hold a different weight from those of his compatriots under the leadership of Kim Jong Il and arguably continues to be the world’s last truly totalitarian regime. Because Kang’s stories are relatively recent, they help to illustrate what life is like for many today in that reclusive country.

Paul Hollander’s work has been in From the Gulag to the Killing Fields is groundbreaking in showing the risks of centralized Communist systems. Each time a Communist country was established, it actually did have an opportunity to foster a new and improved society. However, in adhering to such a stringent ideology that refused to acknowledge civil liberties, each and very time those grand social experiments turned into grand catastrophes, where the means violated the intended and supposedly glorious aims. The system failed time and time again to create a feasible, egalitarian society, and instead constantly resorted to belittling its people through disregard, fear-mongering, violence and constant criticism. Hollander has carried out a great service in compiling this anthology. Let us hope that he has shed light on the dysfunctional nature of communism once and for all.
Many dams are being torn down these days, allowing rivers and the ecosystems they support to rebound. But ecological risks abound as well. Can they be averted?

By Jane C. Marks

What do the Chinese do?

- Energy: The Chinese want to take the pressure off of coal power.
  - So they are building many small dams.

- And they are building many nuclear plants to give energy, reduce air pollution, and reduce CO₂.

- Most dams: They are a place for recreation and fish, they store water to cope with drought; they often give some electricity, and are safe.
  - So why the US bandwagon to tear them down?
  - I think it is very excessive.
At the start of the 20th century, Fossil Creek was a spring-fed waterway sustaining an oasis in the middle of the Arizona desert. The wild river and lush riparian ecosystem attracted fish and a host of animals and plants that could not survive in other environments. The river and its surrounds also attracted prospectors and settlers to the Southwest. By 1916 engineers had dammed Fossil Creek, redirecting water through flumes that wound along steep hillsides to two hydroelectric plants. Those plants powered the mining operations that fueled Arizona's economic growth and helped support the rapid expansion of the city of Phoenix. By 2001, however, the Fossil Creek generating stations were providing less than 0.1 percent of the state's power supply.

Nearly two years ago the plants were shut down, and an experiment began to unfold. In the summer of 2005 utility workers retired the dam and the flumes and in so doing restored most of the flow to the 22.5 kilometers of Fossil Creek riverbed that had not seen much water in nearly a century. Trickles became waterfalls, and stagnant shallows became deep turquoise pools. Scientists are now monitoring the ecosystem to see whether it can recover after being partially sere for so long, to see whether native fish and plants can again take hold. They are also on the lookout for unintended ecological consequences of the project.

Decommissioning dams (particularly small ones, as is the case in Fossil Creek) is becoming a regular occurrence as structures age, provide an inconsequential share of a region's power, become unsafe or too costly to repair, or as communities decide they want their rivers wild and full of fish again. But simply removing a dam does not automatically mean a long-altered ecosystem will flourish once more. As with all things natural, reality often proves far more complex and intricate than people anticipate. Those of us who have witnessed many of the unexpected consequences of dam removals are now using that knowledge to try to minimize negative results in the future.

A Global Trend

Today about 800,000 dams operate worldwide, 45,000 of which are large—that is, greater than 15 meters tall. Most were built in the past century, primarily after World War II. Their benefits are clear. Hydroelectric power makes up 20 percent of the globe's electric supply, and the energy is largely clean and renewable, especially when contrasted with other sources. Dams control flooding, and their reservoirs provide a reliable supply of water for irrigation, drinking and recreation. Some serve to help navigation, by stabilizing flow.

Sandy River Dam removal is part of the long-term restoration of Maine's Kennebec River. In 1999 the Edwards Dam on the Kennebec was taken down; soon after, many of the river's native fish returned and their populations grew dramatically. Unconstrained flow of the Sandy River, a tributary of the Kennebec, was restored last summer to ensure that no barriers prevent migratory fish from moving freely.
Their costs are obvious as well. Dams displace people and as a result have become increasingly controversial in the developing world [see "The Himba and the Dam," by Carol Ezzell; SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, June 2001]. The structures ruin vistas, trap sediments (needed for deltas, riverbanks and beaches), stymie migratory fish and destroy ecosystems in and around waterways. Conservationists have a long history of opposing dams: John Muir tried to block the dam in Yosemite’s Hetch Hetchy Valley; Edward Abbey’s novel The Monkey Wrench Gang targeted Arizona’s Glen Canyon Dam for guerrilla demolition. In recent years, as the downsides of dams have become more widely recognized, groups made up of several interested parties—utility officials, regulators, policymakers, conservationists, native peoples, researchers and the public—have fought to decommission aging dams.

In the U.S., where hydropower dams must be relicensed every 30 to 50 years, the rate of dam removal has exceeded the rate of construction for the past decade or so. In the previous two years alone, about 80 dams have fallen, and researchers following the trend expect that dams will continue to come down, especially small ones. Although the U.S. is currently leading the effort, it is not alone. France has dismantled dams in the Loire Valley; Australia, Canada and Japan have also removed, or are planning to remove, dams.

Clear successes have driven much of this activity. In 1999 engineers took apart the Edwards Dam on Maine’s Kennebec River after a long battle waged by environmentalists culminated in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s denial of a renewal permit. Within years, biologists observed with some surprise the return of scores of striped bass, alewives, American shad, Atlantic salmon, sturgeon, ospreys, kingfishers, cormorants and bald eagles. They also found that the water became well aerated and that populations of important food-chain insects such as mayflies, stoneflies and caddisflies grew.

In the Loire Valley, the story is similar. Salmon were abundant in the 19th century—about 100,000 would migrate each year—but by 1997, only 389 were counted making the trip. Despite the incorporation of fish ladders and elevators, the eight dams along the Loire and its major tributaries—as well as their turbines and pumps—had decimated the salmon population. Nongovernmental organizations, including the European Rivers Network, led a campaign to bring the salmon back. In response, the French government decommissioned four of the dams—two in 1998, one in 2003 and one in 2005. Within a few months of each dam removal, five species of fish, Atlantic salmon and shad...
The U.S. Victory in Vietnam: Lost and Found

- I was very glad to discover this history of the Vietnam War.
- The consequences of losing the war were very tough on the people in S. Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

- Roy Janne
  Nov 2006
The U.S. Victory in Vietnam: Lost and Found

The U.S. war against the insurgents in Iraq has raised the specter of the war fought four decades ago against insurgents in South Vietnam. Critics of the Iraq War contend that the Iraqi insurgency now is like the Vietnamese insurgency then, and that the United States today faces a similar defeat. Conversely, supporters of the Iraq War contend that Iraq bears no similarity to Vietnam and that the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War therefore need not be repeated, especially if the United States demonstrates persistence in its military and political efforts in Iraq.

A very few supporters of the current war (e.g., Melvin Laird, who was Secretary of Defense in the Nixon Administration during the Vietnam War) argue that the two wars are indeed similar, but that the United States had actually won its war in Vietnam by 1973 and it can do so again in much the same way in Iraq. While I disagree with Laird about the similarity of the Vietnam War and the Iraq War—I think they are very different—I believe Laird is correct in his observation that the United States won the Vietnam War in 1973. Of course, this is not the received opinion. If we are to reckon by the “memory” of Vietnam, we had best get the history right.

A Tale of Two Prisms

At the time of the Vietnam War, recent history had provided two very different prisms through which Americans could view the conflict in that strange land which was so remote from any earlier American experience. The first was the prism of the Chinese Revolution of the late 1940s. In this perspective, what had happened in China was best explained by an internal dynamic: a repressive government, acting on behalf of exploitative landlords, was challenged by a revolutionary Communist party, acting on behalf of a repressed and exploited peasantry. The ultimate success of the Communist insurgents was due to domestic conditions, particularly their popular cause, and not due to Soviet support and intervention from the outside. In brief, the Chinese Communists were more Chinese than Communist.

From this perspective, what was true of China in the 1940s was understood to be true of Indochina in the 1960s. The conflict there should be seen as the Vietnamese Revolution, with the Vietnamese Communists being more Vietnamese than Communist. Their ultimate (and inevitable) victory, therefore, would pose no real threat to the

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United States in its great Cold-War struggle with the Soviet Union, or with the very different China. At the time, most academic area specialists dealing with Southeast Asia subscribed to this perspective.

The second prism was the Korean War of the early 1950s. In this perspective, what had happened in Korea was best explained by an external dynamic: an aggressive Communist regime in the North, acting with the direct support first of the Soviet Union and then of Communist China, had invaded a vulnerable country and potential democracy in the South. The initial success of the North Korean army was due to Soviet and Chinese support from the outside and not to any popular cause within Korea. In brief, the North Korean Communists were more Communist than Korean.

From this perspective, what was true of Korea and Northeast Asia in the 1950s was understood to be true of Vietnam and Southeast Asia in the 1960s. The conflict there should be seen as a Communist aggression. The Communist North’s victory, which was by no means inevitable, would pose a real threat to the United States in its great struggle with the Soviet Union and Communist China. At the time, most academic generalists dealing with international politics subscribed to this position.

Now, many years after the end of the Vietnam War, a good case can be made that both perspectives were right, but that they were so at different times: the war began in the early 1960s like the Chinese Revolution, but it ended in the mid-1970s like the Korean War. The turning point between the two prisms was the mid-point of the war: 1968, the year of the Tet Offensive, the de facto abdication of President Lyndon Johnson, and the election of Richard Nixon.

**Tet Offensive 1968**

**Political Defeat versus Military Victory**

The Tet Offensive of January-February 1968 was obviously a U.S. political defeat, but most military analysts have long agreed that it was actually a very significant U.S. military victory. The counterattack operations of the U.S. military not only seriously damaged the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), but they effectively destroyed the South Vietnamese insurgents known as the National Liberation Front (NLF) or Viet Cong (VC). Thereafter, the real threat to South Vietnam came not from the local insurgents, which were repressed or contained by effective U.S. and South Vietnamese counterinsurgency operations, but from massive infiltration or invasion by NVA conventional forces, which had to be deterred or contained by U.S. conventional military forces. Despite this U.S. military victory, however, after Tet the political will of the United States, and especially the will of the Democratic Party, was greatly eroded. Of course, it had been the Democratic administrations of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson that had taken the United States into the Vietnam War in the first place.

**The Strategic Innovations of the Nixon Administration**

The Nixon Administration consequently faced a difficult dilemma when it took office in 1969. On the one hand, U.S. military power remained essential in order to win the war, but the sustained use of U.S. ground forces was no longer politically feasible given domestic U.S. opposition. On the other hand, South Vietnamese (SVN) military forces were also essential in order to win the war, specifically the counterinsurgency part of it, but their effective use was not yet militarily feasible. The obvious solution was to expand and improve the SVN forces, not only to the point that they could effectively cooperate with U.S. forces in counterinsurgency operations, but beyond that to the point that they could effectively repress or contain the Communist insurgents by themselves. This solution was called
the Vietnamization Program.

Yet even when this SVN counterinsurgency capability was achieved, the United States would still have to provide conventional military forces to deter and contain the power of North Vietnam's conventional army. Earlier, the Johnson Administration had also tried to deter and contain North Vietnamese intervention. However, its strategy had been largely to fight North Vietnam within South Vietnam. It had engaged in some limited and fitful bombing of the North, but it refrained from going after the "center of gravity" of North Vietnam (the capital of Hanoi, the port of Haiphong, and the population concentration in the Red River Delta) for fear of provoking military intervention by China or the Soviet Union. The Johnson administration was haunted by the memory of what had happened in 1950 during the Korean War, when U.S. military forces "went North" (crossing the 38th Parallel, which had been the border between South Korea and North Korea) and the Chinese intervened. In a sense, one of the most decisive battles of the Vietnam War had actually been fought a decade-and-a-half before, in Korea.

The new Nixon Administration saw that the solution to the dilemma which it had inherited from the Johnson Administration was composed of two parts: First, superpower diplomacy could separate China and the Soviet Union from North Vietnam and strip away the protective umbrella which each provided to the North. The opportunities for a strategy of dividing one's Communist enemies were greatly enhanced after the Chinese and the Soviets nearly went to war over border and nuclear issues in the fall of 1969. Both China and the Soviet Union wanted something from the United States. For China, this was some kind of diplomatic recognition, and for the Soviets, it was an arms control treaty. For these U.S. concessions, each was willing to withdraw its protection of North Vietnam. The diplomatic maneuvers of President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger achieved their aims, and in the spring of 1972 the United States concluded its grand strategic bargain with each of the two Communist superpowers.

Second, a vigorous Vietnamization program could create an effective South Vietnamese counterinsurgency capacity and permit the U.S. military to withdraw from this kind of operation. In 1969, most Americans did not take the idea of Vietnamization seriously, and when Americans now look back at Vietnam they usually think that it had no real prospect of success. However, it is instructive to compare the U.S. project of building up the security forces in Iraq since 2003 (Iraqization, so to speak) with the U.S. project of Vietnamization after 1968. At every point during the long Vietnam War (1961-1975), South Vietnam had a more unified and organized government and military than any that has existed in Iraq since the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime and the abolition of Saddam's army in the spring of 2003. The problem in South Vietnam was just that its government and military were nonetheless far less unified and organized than those of North Vietnam.

In fact, the underlying social foundations to support political stability were far better in South Vietnam than they are today in Iraq. There were religious and ethnic divisions in South Vietnam (principally between an 80 percent Buddhist majority, a 10 percent Catholic minority, and a 10 percent composed of other religious minorities), but these divisions did not correlate with territorial ones. There was no prospect of one or more sections of the country seceding from the others. In contrast, in Iraq the intense religious and ethnic divisions between the Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds do correlate with territorial
ones. Secessionist projects are a constant threat, and ethnic cleansing operations are a constant experience. One consequence is that in Iraq, while there are many militias that are truly religious or ethnic, there will probably never be a military that is truly Iraqi. This was not true of South Vietnam.

In any event, by 1969 several developments had come together within South Vietnam to increase the probability of a successful Vietnamization program:

(1) The aforementioned devastation of the Viet Cong insurgents after Tet.
(2) Major recent improvements in the stability of the SVN government and the effectiveness of the SVN counterinsurgency forces.
(3) An effective land reform program, which gave legitimacy to the SVN government and caused peasants to withdraw their support from the Communist insurgents.

As a result of the above three developments, when the U.S. counterinsurgency forces began to stand down, the SVN counterinsurgency forces were able to stand up. The Administration generalized this positive development into the “Nixon Doctrine,” the idea that the United States would not deploy its ground forces in foreign countries in tasks where and when local ground forces were able to perform those tasks. With respect to the specific task of counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, the Vietnamization strategy had largely achieved its aims by the spring of 1972.3

Meanwhile, back in the United States, there were intense and widespread student protests against the Vietnam War, especially in 1969 and 1970—the American emergence of the “Generation of ’68,” or the Baby Boomers. These dramatic protests certainly reinforced the conclusion that the sustained use of U.S. ground forces in South Vietnam was no longer politically feasible and that the Vietnamization program was a political necessity. Nixon and Kissinger persisted, despite the protests, in their long-term strategy to win the war. And indeed, after a giant surge of campus protests in the spring of 1970, the student movement greatly declined within the next year. The major reason for this decline was that the Administration moved to end the military draft. No longer facing the prospect of their own deaths in the war—only the deaths of the Vietnamese—the students returned to their other, more traditional student priorities. And so, the Administration’s Vietnam strategy continued on its steady course.

The U.S. Bombings of 1972
In 1972, North Vietnam tried to abort the progress of the Vietnamization program with its Spring Offensive, a conventional invasion by the North Vietnamese Army across the 17th Parallel separating North and South Vietnam. However, Nixon and Kissinger had largely completed their diplomatic project and had neutralized both China and the Soviet Union. They were thus able to retaliate against the NVA invasion by bombing Hanoi and Haiphong, the first time that this had occurred in the war. Reeling from the attack, the North had to halt its invasion.

Having demonstrated that it could now bomb Hanoi and Haiphong—the center of gravity of the North—if it chose to do so, the Nixon Administration had greatly improved its position in its ongoing negotiations with North Vietnam over the future of South Vietnam. The U.S. position was further strengthened in November 1972 with Nixon’s re-election by a landslide and in December 1972 with new and massive air strikes upon Hanoi and Haiphong (“the Christmas bombings”). In January 1973, North Vietnam and the United States, along

The Vietnam Armistice of 1973
The Accords provided for a cease-fire or armistice; this would enable the United States to withdraw its military forces from South Vietnam with a semblance of "peace with honor." (The Korean War had also ended with an armistice in 1953—but not with the withdrawal of U.S. troops.) The Accords also allowed North Vietnam to keep some of its troops on the territory of South Vietnam, an obviously risky situation for the South.4

The United States sought to reassure the South with a commitment to provide large-scale and long-term assistance to South Vietnam's economy and to its military, which would continue the buildup of the South and complete the project of Vietnamization. (This too was similar to what the United States had provided South Korea after the end of the Korean War.) This assistance would enable South Vietnam to deal successfully with any future Communist insurgency using its own ground forces.

The most important element of the Vietnam settlement, however, drew upon the bombing experiences of 1972. In order to enforce the armistice, and in order to deter or contain future conventional aggression by the NVA, the United States promised South Vietnam—and informed North Vietnam—that if the North should once again undertake such aggression, the United States would also once again engage in a massive bombing of the North. (This kind of threat has also always been an implied part of the armistice in Korea.) This would enable the United States to successfully deal with any future North Vietnamese conventional in-

The US would stop big attacks

vasion by means of the U.S. Air Force alone.

The NVA forces left within South Vietnam made this last element problematic, however. This weakness or flaw would need to be outweighed or overcome by high U.S. persistence in its economic and military assistance to South Vietnam and by high U.S. credibility in its bombing threat to North Vietnam. But Nixon's impressive landslide re-election in November 1972, which he took to provide him with a mandate, seemed to make his persistence and this credibility likely well into the future.

In short, as of January 1973, a good case could be made that the strategy of the Nixon Administration had enabled the United States to win its war in Vietnam. As with its earlier war in Korea, the U.S. had not exactly defeated the North, but it had achieved its war aims of preserving the basic territorial integrity, military security, and political stability of the South. All in all, it could be seen as a very impressive achievement, one purchased at great cost in American blood and treasure, and accomplished with the Administration's great diplomatic skill and sustained political will.

The Reversal of the U.S. Victory
What aborted this grand strategy for Vietnam was Watergate. At the very moment that the Nixon Administration concluded the Vietnam Peace Accords in Paris (January 1973), it was called into federal court because of its burglary of a Democratic Party office in the Watergate building in Washington, D.C., along with its other covert activities directed at the Administration's political opponents. This devastating political development radically shifted the balance of power between the President and the Congress (which was controlled by the Democratic Party), and
therefore the balance between the Republicans and the Democrats. By this time, the Democrats were dominated by activists who wanted America out of Vietnam as soon as possible and unconditionally. They cared little about the security and liberty of the people of South Vietnam or even about the reputation and credibility of the United States in international politics; they mocked the notion that Communism presented a threat to America and to the world. On the contrary, they cared most about the anti-war (and sometimes anti-American) views of the media and the student protesters, many of whom were now becoming prominent within the Democratic Party. Although the Democratic Party’s approach toward the Vietnam War had been rejected in two Presidential elections—1968 and 1972—that party now achieved effective control of U.S. foreign policy through its control of Congress.

Congress soon imposed a very substantial reduction in U.S. economic and military assistance to South Vietnam, greatly weakening the Vietnamization and counterinsurgency element of the Vietnam settlement. It then passed the War Powers Act of 1973, which sought to limit the President’s independent use of military force, seriously weakening the deterrence and counter-conventional element of the armistice. The threat of impeachment by Congress then drove Nixon to resign the Presidency in August 1974. Shortly thereafter, the North Vietnamese leadership decided on a major NVA conventional offensive in South Vietnam, to be undertaken in the spring of 1975.\footnote{The attack}

When that offensive came, Gerald Ford, who was now President, and Henry Kissinger, who was now Secretary of State, sought to execute the bombing threat which had underlain the Vietnam armistice and settlement. But this course of action now required the approval of Congress, and Congress denied the Administration’s pleas. Left alone and left without hope, SVN forces were soon overrun, South Vietnam collapsed, and North Vietnam finally achieved total victory in its long and costly war.\footnote{Contrary to a popular impression among many today, the Vietnam War was lost, not to an insurgency, but to a massive conventional invasion across a border recognized in international treaties.}

**What If?**

What would have happened if there had been no Watergate affair and therefore no repeal of Nixon’s 1972 electoral mandate, and if there had been no Congressional thwarting of the Nixon Administration’s Vietnam strategy but instead a continuing support of the same?

**Strategic flaws inside South Vietnam: The NVA Presence.** On the one hand, by leaving NVA forces within some parts of South Vietnam, the Nixon strategy had allowed a serious internal problem of deterrence and containment to remain, one that was not as easy to solve as was the external problem presented by NVA forces within North Vietnam itself. On the other hand, the two elements of the strategy (the Vietnamization program and the bombing threat, backed by U.S. persistence and credibility) might have been strengthened so that even the internal threat could have been successfully deterred and contained. The U.S. effort along these lines in Vietnam after 1973 would have to have been even greater than the comparable U.S. effort in Korea after 1953. But if American political will had been behind the Nixon strategy, the strategy probably could have succeeded.

**Strategic flaws near South Vietnam: The Cambodian Communists.** On the one hand, the U.S.-supported regime in Cambodia almost certainly would have fallen to the Cambodian Communist insurgents (the Khmer Rouge) in 1975 or not long thereafter.
The consequences of victory of N. Vietnam

The Consequences of the North Vietnamese Victory: Then and Now

The initial consequences. In the actual event, all three non-Communist states in Indochina—South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—fell to victorious Communist forces in 1975. South Vietnam was quickly merged with the North into a united, Communist Vietnam. The new regime rounded up and sent off to jungle concentration camps (“re-education centers”) about one million South Vietnamese who had been associated with the old SVN government and military; half of these would be detained for two to five years, and thousands would die in these camps. In subsequent years, moreover, more than one million Vietnamese fled from Communist Vietnam as “boat people,” preferring the risks of death at sea to life under the Communist regime.

In Cambodia, the consequences of the Communist victory were far worse: the Khmer Rouge executed more than two million Cambodians from all sectors of society, or more than 25 percent of the population. In Laos, where it had been presumed that the Communists would be more moderate than elsewhere, most of the old political and social elite were put in prison, where many died, including the former king and his family. In short, the first few years after the Communist victories saw a vast wave of retribution and executions roll over the countries of Indochina—another horrifying chapter in what we now recognize as “the Black Book of Communism.”

The response of the United States—and particularly of the Democratic Party and, after 1976, of the Democratic Administration of Jimmy Carter—to all this was to say very little and to do absolutely nothing. They were joined in their indifference by the now-adults who had been the student anti-war protesters of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Boomer students who had always been so eager to condemn human rights abuses by the U.S.-backed governments of South Vietnam. At the time of the protests, critics had often accused the students of being self-indulgent and simple-minded. Then, when the protests rapidly declined after the end of the military draft, the students were accused of being feckless and hypocritical as well. If there had ever been reasons to doubt the truth of these accusations, they ceased to exist in the midst of the great silence of the ex-protesters now that Communism took its toll throughout Southeast Asia.

Even today, many Boomers (particularly aging members of university faculties) look back on their days of anti-war protesting as the best, most moral moment of their lives, and they proudly take credit for ending the U.S. efforts in the war. But as such, they are morally responsible for the U.S. abandonment of the peoples of Indochina, and they are morally responsible—indeed, because of their great silence after 1975, doubly responsible—for the retribution and executions which were the results of the Communist victories there.

The later consequences. The waves of history continued to roll on over Indochina, however. By late 1978, the disputes between...
the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists had reached the point that Vietnam invaded Cambodia and installed a new regime composed of its Communist allies. The ousted Khmer Rouge then began a new insurgency, which the Vietnamese military tried to put down with its own counterinsurgency war. In response, Communist China, which had long supported the Khmer Rouge, invaded the northern border region of Vietnam in early 1980. The Vietnamese military was successful in blunting this offensive, and the Chinese quickly withdrew. In short, within five years after the Communist victories in Indochina, each of the Asian Communist powers or movements which the United States had sought to contain by its military intervention in the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1973—China, North Vietnam, and the Khmer Rouge—had gone to war with each other. In the end, the expansion of Communism in Southeast Asia was indeed effectively contained—not by the United States, but by the Communists themselves.

The eventual consequences. The waves of history still continued to roll on. By the early 1990s, the Communist regime in Vietnam had arrived at the conclusion that it too had to reconcile itself with the post-Cold-War economic program of opening one’s country to the world market and to globalization. And thus, by 1995, the twentieth anniversary of the great North Vietnamese victory in South Vietnam, a united and Communist Vietnam was providing very attractive economic incentives to multinational corporations from the United States, Japan, and other capitalist countries so that they would enter Vietnam and establish manufacturing plants there. These incentives were so attractive that many American and other corporations did so, and have continued to do so, down to the present day.

And so, today, if we ask the question, Who won the Vietnam War?, we might get a different answer than we would have gotten in earlier years. In 1973, it was reasonable to think that the United States had won the war. In 1975, it was clear that Communism, and North Vietnam more particularly, had won the war. In 1980, it was still clear that North Vietnam had won the war, but, given the new wars between the Asian Communist states, it was no longer clear that Communism in general had won the war. And today, given the mutually beneficial and profitable relationship between the Vietnamese Communist regime and American corporations, it is reasonable to conclude that both North Vietnam and the United States, each in their own way, won the Vietnam War. But since Vietnam today is very much an active and cooperative participant in the U.S.-led global economic system, and even in the developing U.S. security system for Southeast Asia, perhaps it might be said that, in the end, the United States won, most of all.

But then there is that other question, Who lost the Vietnam War? And here the answer is clear: all those South Vietnamese who, during the war, had allied with the United States and relied upon its promises and who, after 1975, paid dearly with their freedom or even with their lives for having done so. Their loss was tragic because their faith in an eventual U.S. victory had proven to be in vain. It had been especially tragic because when victory was actually achieved by the Americans—by the Nixon Administration and the American soldiers in particular—it was then cavalierly thrown away—by the Democratic Party and the student protestors. And with it were thrown away those many thousands upon thousands of South Vietnamese of whom it might truly be said: They lost the Vietnam War.


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The U.S. Victory in Vietnam by James Kurth

2005), 22-43.


- end -

*But also see next 2 pages*

- Ray Penne

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About the Cultural Revolution (China)

Red-Color News Soldier is the literal translation of the four Chinese characters printed on the armband first given to Li Zhensheng and his rebel group in Beijing at the end of 1966, eight months after the launch of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. There are other, more fluent translations, but none retains the musicality of the four character words brought together.

For a long time in the Western world, Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution were perceived with amazement and fascination; only very rarely with horror. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, rioting students around the world were inspired by the finger-pointing, slogan-shouting style of the Red Guards, and Andy Warhol in New York was producing his renowned silk-screen paintings of Mao, the “Great Helmsman.” Even today, all the chaos of that period can seem somewhat romantic and idealistic in comparison with the contemporary Chinese society we see and hear about.

With this in mind, it was necessary to produce a clearer and more truthful image of the turmoil that turned China upside down during the Cultural Revolution. Li Zhensheng was the one person who, through his exceptional photographic legacy, could convey this truth on the printed page. A few guidelines were established up-front with Li's agreement: none of the photographs would be cropped; the images would be presented in the most accurate chronological order possible so as to best depict the historical process; and precise captions would accompany the images, with facts verified through additional research and double-checked against the archives of the Heilongjiang Daily, where Li worked for eighteen years.

Over a period of several years, Li delivered to the offices of Contact Press Images in New York approximately thirty-thousand small brown paper envelopes bound together with rubber bands in groups according to chronology, location, type of film, or other criteria that changed over time. Each envelope contained a single negative inside a glassine pouch. Some of these had not been removed since Li had cut them from their original negative strips and hidden them away thirty-five years earlier. On each envelope Li had written detailed captions in delicate Chinese calligraphy. Communes and counties, people’s names, official titles, and specific events were all carefully noted. Yet as Li’s written account clearly demonstrates, his memory of the period is still clear and detailed.

For three years, from 2000 to 2003, a small group including Li, translator Rong Jiang, writer Jacques Menasche, and I (and later to be joined by Li’s daughter Xiaonong) met nearly every Sunday to collectively piece together this history of a largely unknown era. In these exhausting and, at times, animated sessions, we pored over a variety of archival and scholarly documents, conducted interviews, reviewed images, and even listened to Li sing revolutionary songs from the time.

During the period of the Cultural Revolution the whole of China became a theater in which the audience was increasingly part of the play—from the poorest peasant attending a “struggle session” to the “class enemy” forced to bow at the waist in humiliation; from the rarely seen leader waving from a Jeep to the denounced and the denouncers; from the rebels to the counter-
other needs. The CMB also receives fax charts, mostly from Japan.

I. Some Personal Comments

The China Situation, 1950-1980

I was told that "In the 50's we learned Russian. In the 60's after the Cultural Revolution started (1966), we learned nothing. It was in full swing by 1968-69. Now we are so eager to catch up, we can go overboard". Such as by purchasing too much high technology. There were many, many stories about the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four and the havoc brought by this period. Sometimes the statements were matter-of-fact or showed some disbelief that this could happen. Sometimes the personal anger or hurt showed.

The universities were closed from about 1967-72, 6 years. Many professors were sent to the country. Mao encouraged the students at first, then it is hard to tell. He couldn't control them. Then the students attacked officials "We want to get rid of them". A Chinese friend compared it somewhat to Iran in 1980.

About 2 to 4 years later than China, the U.S. had somewhat similar social conditions, but with much less amplitude. A Canadian climate friend made the following comments about this period: At one time only one university west of Montreal had a permanent president. Being president was a very bad job to have then, it was a center of authority to attack. One really can't attack a thing like parliament, it is too amorphous. He said the movement seemed to start in Berkeley and spread around. Some of the spreading just happened and some by design. One or two new students or faculty would help get it started. During this period 325 U.S. universities were without presidents.

The Chinese friend commented that China was like that too. It got started at one university and spread very rapidly. The Chinese people didn't like it. It hurt the whole economy. Those were really bad years. Finally got the universities back about 1973. Other Chinese have commented that 10 years were lost.

Before I went to China, it seemed clear from press reports that the new government was on a new political course and was trying to put the Mao era (and Gang of 4) behind them. The changes seem much bigger than I imagined. The new government is pro development, pro practicality, pro consumer, pro U.S. ties, anti radical, anti bureaucratic over-control, etc. They deserve encouragement.

We went to the Chinese Opera once and to acrobatic performances twice. It was great!

Note: France had very bad uprisings in 1968.

M. China Climatic Atlas and China data listings given to me in Beijing (Tom Potter, EDIS-NOAA also got a copy).

1. Climatological atlas of China (nicely done, in color--no English)
Pol Pot, Sidney Schanberg and the Killing Fields

'The Worst Genocide Ever'

1.8 to 2.2 million people were killed in Cambodia.

In the 1970s

Just four days before the fall of Phnom Penh, Sidney Schanberg, of the New York Times, wrote under the headline, "Indochina Without Americans: For Most, a Better Life." Mr. Schanberg comforted us with the prediction that after victory the Khmer Rouge would be more moderate.

6-37
Pol Pot, Sidney Schanberg and the Killing Fields

Goodness gracious! Pol Pot. Leader of the Communist Khmer Rouge. How interesting to run into you here. But without your friends Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon, with whom I'd have thought from press accounts from your glory days that you were indelibly linked. But here you are, author of the famous Cambodian Killing Fields, the Cambodian Holocaust, renowned in press, screen, and television, and whose recent tally of dead Cambodians (according to Yale's Ben Kiernan) was 1.7 million.

And now you're suddenly on everybody's front page as either dead, a fugitive from the Cambodian authorities, or captured and awaiting trial for your wicked deeds and held by Phnom Penh's present leaders. But no Kissinger, not even a mention in all the press accounts.

And here it was the received wisdom of every high-minded college student a while back that Henry Kissinger was behind it all. Or at least扮演ing the role of those evil deeds were so great in this sideshow to the Vietnam War that he should surely be held accountable. Actually word of the Cambodian Holocaust only began to leak out in the late 1970s. But it was never too late for the anti-war Left to blame Mr. Kissinger.

And now, with Pol Pot nearing the end of his run, with everybody reexamining his career back to his student days in Paris, poor Henry can't even get his name in print. A learned colleague of mine, who spent his years at Harvard studying Chinese, was amazed during a subsequent visit to Cambridge to find that his old friends, once whipped into a frenzy over America's ghastly deeds in southeast Asia, now seemed to have forgotten that part of the world completely.

The thousands of students who once marched on our troops crossed the border into Cambodia's "Parrot's Beak" and "Fish Hook" regions — from which North Vietnamese forces had been launching napalm attacks into South Vietnam and then withdrawing with their gains. Do they have the faintest idea of what had been going on there since. Who was winning? Had the four Kent State students died in vain? What had that whole thing been about anyway?

Seen from American campuses things had been quiet enough for a time — with U.S. troops withdrawn and the Vietnamese just fighting each other — until 1975 when Saigon and Phnom Penh fell. Of the two, Cambodia was far more dramatic, as Pol Pot and his followers immediately began to "empty" Phnom Penh in accordance with an idealistic university dissertation one of Pol Pot's followers had written when they were all students in Paris. The cities of Cambodia, it seemed, were the center of all corruption. So the Khmer Rouge — a murderous dream of power — proceeded to kill everyone in the cities who could read or write, wore eyeglasses, or had uncalled-for hands. They abolished private property, money, religion, the educational, judicial, and postal systems, and then drove out along the roads from Phnom Penh everyone they could find, particularly schoolteachers, doctors, engineers, the disabled in their wheelchairs, the sick in their hospital beds — all out to the killing on the same people they blamed for Vietnam. And once again, Henry Kissinger was in the headlines along with his friend Pol Pot.

In 1979 a British journalist named William Shawcross produced a book entitled "Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia," a fearless attempt to place on America responsibility for the horrors wrought by the Khmer Rouge. And Henry and his boss were back. The reasoning is a bit contemptible.

Just four days before the fall of Phnom Penh, Sidney Schanberg, of the New York Times, wrote under the headline, "Indochina Without Americans: For Most, a Better Life." Mr. Schanberg comforted us with the prediction that after victory the Khmer Rouge would be more moderate.

Fields. In this manner, by working them to death, starvation, burying them alive, or more conventional forms of murder, they wiped out one third of the country's population.

For many Americans, coming as the Cambodian Holocaust did immediately after the fall of Saigon, it all seemed pretty much an epilogue to the Vietnam War. And before long the anti-war Left found a way of blaming Cambodia for what they called the "Killing Fields. In this manner, by working them to death, starvation, burying them alive, or more conventional forms of murder, they wiped out one third of the country's population.

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Richard Grenier is a columnist for The Washington Times.
By Joseph A. Mussomeli

PHNOM PENH—One of the greatest crimes of the 20th century has gone unpunished for 30 years. Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer Rouge systematically tortured, starved and “smashed” approximately 2.2 million fellow Cambodians, or between one-fourth and one-third of the entire population. Their list of enemies was long: the indigenous Muslim population, the Vietnamese minority, Buddhist monks, city dwellers, anyone with a diploma, and especially fellow Khmer Rouge suspected of treason, among others. All these groups and many others—along with wives, husbands and children—were annihilated in arguably the worst genocide ever perpetrated.

Why do I say “the worst genocide ever,” when there is such stiff competition in a world that sometimes seems to have lost any sense of compassion? Because this genocide stands alone as having failed to bring any of the guilty to justice. From the Nuremberg Trials to the more recent tribunals in Bosnia, Serbia and Rwanda, the victims of the 20th century’s worst genocides have been given some semblance of justice, some degree of retribution. But not here in Cambodia.

Why does this matter? Some would argue that the Khmer Rouge’s enlightenment and political and economic terms. The devastation is also psychological and spiritual. All the country’s laws—from trafficking in persons to the rampant corruption that pervades every level of government—have been exacerbated by the failure to bring the leaders of the Khmer Rouge to justice. The culture of impunity that we see throughout Cambodia today is rooted in Cambodians’ belief that conventional crimes pale beside the crimes of the Khmer Rouge, and that few crimes are so great that they must be punished. After all, the thinking goes, even the Khmer Rouge leaders got off scot-free.

A Khmer Rouge tribunal is a necessary first step to healing the three-decades-old wound that continues to fester. There will remain severe limitations on how far Cambodia can reform until some degree of justice is rendered.

Recently, there has been some progress in creating a Khmer Rouge tribunal, with United Nations cooperation. But time is running out. The killers are growing old. In another decade, they will likely all have died, peaceful deaths. Just last week, Ta Mok died. Death, which had already stolen from so many Cambodians their lives and their happiness, has now stolen from them a chance for justice.

Grandfather Mok, as he was better known, was likely directly responsible for the murder of tens of thousands of his fellow Cambodians. But neighbors and old comrades wept when they heard of the death of this distinguished and highly intelligent public servant. The nature in which he was mourned reminds us of just why these tribunals must move forward.

As the Catholic writer Thomas Merton once remarked about the Nazis, labeling the killers as insane or inherently evil wrongly permits us the comfort of believing that normal, ordinarily decent people could never commit these types of crimes. But the real horror, as Merton pointed out, is that most perpetrators are neither insane, nor pathologically cruel, people.

How will our hunger for justice ever be satisfied if more of those guilty of this crime are allowed to quietly end their days in peace, having never acknowledged their crimes or accepted responsibility for the horrors they inflicted? The millions of Cambodians who suffered deserve to have their hunger for justice satisfied.

Mr. Mussomeli is U.S. ambassador to Cambodia.
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia (AP) — Malaysian authorities have pushed 2,500 arriving Vietnamese refugees back out to sea over the past week, officials reported Saturday.

Vietnam, meanwhile, denounced a proposed world conference to solve Southeast Asia’s refugee crisis as an “imperialist conspiracy.”

Malaysian officials said the “boat people” had been turned away as part of the country’s tough new policy to prevent new refugees from landing.

Nine hundred refugees on two boats were intercepted off Malaysia’s Trengganu coast, 170 miles northeast of Kuala Lumpur, on Thursday. Some local news reports said navy and army personnel fired automatic rifles to scare off the two boats, but security officials denied this.

Government officials had announced June 15 that the 76,000 boat people sheltered in Malaysia would be towed out to sea and any new arrivals would be “shot on sight.” The government later backed down and said it would not shoot any refugees and that the refugees already here could stay until new homes were found in third countries.

An estimated 300,000 or more refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos are sheltered in other nations of Southeast Asia.

In a commentary Saturday, Vietnam’s Communist Party newspaper Nhan Dan said a proposed conference on Indochinese refugees is part of a slanderous campaign.

Last week, Vietnam announced its readiness to attend a U.N.-sponsored refugee conference but denounced plans for other conferences.

It remained unclear whether Hanoi intended to participate in refugee talks but Western diplomats in Kuala Lumpur said they expected it would hold and saw the Vietnamese denunciation as a self-defense campaign.

In related developments:

—Philippine Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo said in Manila he had learned that the U.N. Security Council would take up the refugee issue, possibly next week. U.N. officials have made no announcement of either a Council meeting or a U.N.-sponsored conference.

—In Bangkok, Thailand, Vietnamese Ambassador Hoang Bao Son claimed Vietnamese authorities were cracking down on the flight of refugees and the outflow had already decreased. But U.N. officials said it was increasing.

—Malaysian and Indonesian officials prepared for talks about the refugee question with a Vietnamese delegation in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur beginning Sunday.

—In Tokyo, the government said it would allow more refugees to settle in Japan. The decision is subject to formal approval by the Cabinet, expected early next month.

June 24, 1979

The Sunday Camera
Boulder, Colo

June 1979

* The boat people *

The fall of South Vietnam caused many problems

Many people tried to escape the country on boats

Roy Jensen
May 2006
Media Slant News Of War, Dole Says

By BILL STALL
SAN FRANCISCO—(AP)—The Republican national chairman accused the nation's news media Saturday of giving Americans and the world a distorted view of the war in Vietnam and the reaction to it by demonstrators at home.

Sen. Robert Dole of Kansas said the reports of leading newspapers (he specifically named the New York Times and television commentators) are "viewed through the prisms of prejudice" and encourage the North Vietnamese into thinking the nation is badly split over President Nixon's conduct of the war.

"This is not only unfair and unprofessional," Dole said, "it is downright dangerous. It could cost lives."

NATION UNITED

"The news media is presenting a false picture of a deeply divided America in a nervous crisis—rather than the true picture of a largely united America standing firmly behind the resolute but carefully planned and calmly decided actions of its President."

In this time of crisis, particularly, Dole added, such distorted reporting "amounts to attempted media sabotage of the national policies of the United States."

Dole's comments came in a luncheon address to the California Republican State Convention. He prefaced his speech by saying, "I'm not here to broadly attack the media." In two instances he departed from his prepared text to refer to "some of the media" instead of simply "the media."

AFTER PROTEST

The GOP chairman's speech came the day after 3,000 demonstrators gathered outside the same hotel to protest the President's war policies. Dole encouraged Republicans to "stand up and protest...the next time you see some insignificant demonstration given equal time to the President of the United States."

Long ago, he said, the news media for some reason "decided that the war against Communist aggression in South Vietnam was wrong, was evil and had to be impeded and stopped if possible."

The protest Friday came as Gov. Ronald Reagan of California and Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York were kicking off President Nixon's re-election campaign in the state.

'VESTED INTEREST'

Dole said the media has a "vested interest in our defeat."

He added, "We get a lot of network news film on phony rigged demonstrations by professional activists who represent nothing but their own psychosis."

If the North Vietnamese believe the false picture they get of reaction in America, Dole said, they will only be encouraged to make decisions leading to more bloodshed.

May 14, 1972

Vietnam

Media sabotage

6-41
Cambodia's fate unfolding fast

Joseph C. Harsch
Christian Science Monitor
News Service

The last thing in the world Peking would want would be the Russians combined with a strong and united Indochina.'

Washington can provide the kind of economic aid which could revive the economy of North Vietnam. And it has something else more important in the long run working for its purpose. The Chinese government in Peking is no more anxious to see Hanoi become the master of all of Indochina than is Washington.'

THE REAL QUESTION about Indochina ever since World War II has been whether it would be a united and strong entity. That was the dream of Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh and continues to be the dream goal of his successors in Hanoi.

But a united Indochina could play as important a role in southeast Asia as Tito's Yugoslavia has played in Communist Europe. It would be economically strong and could be politically and militarily important.

It was fear of precisely this which drew the United States into 20 years of entanglement in the jungles of Indochina. At the outset Washington was determined not to allow Indochina to become an outpost in southeast Asia of a monolithic Communist bloc.

But patterns in the Communist world have shifted, and now the questions are: Who would control a united Indochina if it ever did come into being? Would it be Russia or China? Would it play the same kind of independently roving role which Marshal Tito has played so skillfully in Europe?

THE LAST THING in the world Peking would want would be the Russians combined with a strong and united Indochina. Perhaps their ideal would be an Indochina in their own pocket. But could they count on being accepted in Hanoi as No. 1 big brother? Small countries almost always want a remote protector against the big neighbor.

From the Chinese point of view a fragmented Indochina is the safest solution. Chinese diplomacy has always sought just that kind of protection for China's frontiers. It is friendly, but weak neighbors. So Peking is Dr. Kissinger's natural ally in trying to save an independent South Vietnam and prevent Hanoi from getting control of Cambodia. But would they really be able to control a government which was largely dominated by the successful local Communist forces?

We all know by now, or should, that Communism has never successfully resisted nationalism. In theory, all Communists live in harmonious brotherhood. In practice the two bitterest enemies in the world today are the Russian and Chinese Communists. There is no certainty that a local Communist victory in Cambodia will in fact mean Cambodia coming under Hanoi's control. It just might work the other way. We are, it seems, going to have a chance to find out — very soon.
They fled terror in Laos after secretly aiding American forces in the Vietnam War. Now 200,000 Hmong prosper—and struggle—in the United States

BY MARC KAUFMAN

Hmong people

AMERICAN ODYSSEY

LATE ONE NIGHT this past April in a suburb of St. Paul, Minnesota, a window in Cha Vang's split-level house shattered and a container filled with fire accelerant landed inside. Vang, his wife and three daughters, ages 12, 10 and 3, escaped the blaze, but the $400,000 house was destroyed. "If you want to terrorize a person or send a message, you slash a tire," Vang, a 39-year-old prominent Hmong-American businessman and political figure, told the St. Paul Pioneer Press. "To burn down a house with people sleeping in it is attempted murder."

Police believe that the incident may have been connected to two previous near-fatal attacks—a shooting and another firebombing—directed at members of the local Hmong community. The St. Paul-Minneapolis metropolitan area is home to 60,000 of the nation's roughly 200,000 Hmong (pronounced "mong"), an ethnic group from Laos who began seeking sanctuary in the United States following the Vietnam War. Vang is the son of Gen. Vang Pao, the legendary commander of the Hmong guerrillas whom the CIA recruited in the early 1960s to aid U.S. pilots shot down in Laos and bordering Vietnam and also to harry communist forces there. Today, Gen. Vang Pao, who resides near Los Angeles, is the acknowledged patriarch of his exiled countrymen. Many Hmong-Americans are convinced that agents of the communist Laotian government were behind the attack on Vang's family.

The violence in St. Paul briefly cast a light, albeit a harsh one, on what otherwise may be the most extraordinary immigrant story in this immigrant nation in a long time. No group of refugees has been less prepared for modern American life than the Hmong, and yet none has succeeded more quickly in making itself at home here. In Laos, the Hmong inhabited isolated highland hamlets and lived as subsistence farmers, some also growing opium poppies as a cash crop. Though they are an ancient people tracing their ancestry to China, where they endured more than 4,000 years as an oppressed minority before fleeing to Laos 200 years ago, the Hmong, at least as far as scholars know, did not have a written language until the 1950s. After the Vietnam War and their largely unheralded efforts on behalf of U.S. forces, Hmong-Americans are melding old ways and new. "Friends told me this was a crazy idea, we're in America, not Laos," says Tom Lor (left, who married Xiong Mee Vue Lo, wearing white shirt, and adopted her children ages 3 to 13, after a clan elder arranged an introduction). "But so far, it seems to be working."
LEADERS of the 75 Communist parties meeting in Moscow—and those conspicuously absent—often argue bitterly about what their faith, Marxism, means. More interesting is the question of what Marxism does. How strong is its influence today? Who accounts for its ability to renew its appeal? Who needs it?

As a theory of society, Marxism's "laws" have been mocked by events, such as the increasing prosperity of the workers and the near disappearance of cyclical economic crises. As a political movement and myth, it has been far more successful. Regimes calling themselves Marxist (and who has a right to say they are not?) rule a third of mankind. Their future expansion, while not as likely as it seemed 20 years ago, is by no means impossible. And neither failed Marxist theory nor entrenched Marxist power explains why Marxism can today provide slogans for the uproot in U.S. colleges and ghettos, courage for guerrillas in Viet Nam, flickers of hope for anxious intellectuals and bewildered peasants.

Functionally, Marxism is a vision, belonging more to politics than to science or politics. It began as a sensitive man's response to an early stage of a fundamental transformation in the human condition. The great change that had set in by the middle of the 19th century still rolls on, gathering speed and extending its breadth. Today, as in Marx's time, men feel the change as both a threat and a promise. It evokes fear and hope simultaneously. The Marxist vision is a peculiar, sometimes deadly—but for many men an effective—way of perceiving the moving society and relating themselves to it.

Dr. Marx concocted a "total" theory, a consistent set of symbols, to explain the course of history, and he intended his theory to be swallowed whole. The vision derives much of its poetic force from its unity, although few modern men gulp down the whole brew. Outside the Communist countries, formal conversion to Marxism is now rarer than it was a generation ago. Much Marxist influence is indirect and fragmentary. In some minds, fragments of the Marxist vision coexist—illogically—with Christianity or Freudianism. For most, it provides a rationale for criticizing society as it is, rather than a plan for moving toward society as it ought to be.

Alienation and Anarchism

Nevertheless, Marxist influence is still potent, especially where men find themselves in situations somehow analogous to those that surrounded Marx in the Europe of five generations ago. Leaving aside the uses of Marxism within the Communist-rulled countries, groups especially susceptible to the vision today include the peoples of less advanced countries now experiencing early stages of modernization, and certain unassimilated groups (for example, radical U.S. blacks) in advanced countries. Equally susceptible are intellectuals and youth.

Why and how the Marxist vision attracts many members of this mixed bag may be explained by a quick look back at Marx's Europe of the 1840s, which in today's parlance would be called a "developing area." Its social structure was crumbling under the impact of science and industrialization. Three attitudes toward change were fairly clearly defined: 1) conservative, 2) progressive or, as it was then called, "liberal," and 3) revolutionary. Then, as now, thoroughly revolutionary people tried to find; nobody seriously tried to restore the pre-industrial Europe. But there were many clingers, people who fought rear-guard actions, defending for reasons of interest or sentiment one or another bastion of the pre-industrial past. Against them, the liberals, mainly middle-class and including many intellectuals, carried the fight for science, industrialization, education and the nation-state, promising (recklessly) a tomorrow of peace and enlightenment.

Between those two groups there was no doubt where Marx stood: for science against religion, for industrialism against "the idiocy of rural life," for the new nation-state against the remnants of the old political order. But he regarded the new order, capitalism, as a transient phase that would soon destroy itself and be replaced by a wave that he saw expressed in the third attitude toward the new order, revolution. The liberals, eyes on the future, tended to be insensitive to the suffering, material and psychological, caused by the march of the new order. Marx was not. He believed, incorrectly, as it turned out, that the material condition of the workers must worsen as capitalism developed. But his observations about psychological "alienation" in a changing society have proved much more durable.

Appealing Ambivalence

The revolutionary spirit in Marx's Europe was essentially anarchistic. It was the revolt of men alienated by industrializing change from the land, from their tools, from a sense of their status—however humble—in a society that they understood. Although Marx sympathized with the feelings that called forth this revolt, he recognized anarchism's impotence and fought it bitterly. In his view, nothing could or should stop the march of industrialization and its political and social consequences.

Thus, a key element in the Marxist vision was his effort to channel the anarchistic spirit so that it would be in favor of industrialism but opposed to the capitalists. His intellectual support of the new order fused with his passionate sense of justice to shape a way of being that was simultaneously on the side of progress and in revolt against its present villains who controlled both government and the means of production. This ambivalent way of dealing with the stress of rapid social change retains its appeal for many men today.

This appeal arises from the fact that many countries are now in situations resembling the Europe of the 1840s. Those who wish to lead must notice the resentments of men displaced by progress from the land and from the certainties of traditional society. In developing countries, for example, a leader can put himself on the side of industrialization and modernization while at the same time blaming the capitalists (in practice, this often means the U.S.) for the suffering and alienation.

"Yankee go home" descends from the Marxist vision, combining rising nationalism with class hostility.

Many advanced nations, including the U.S., contain "underdeveloped countries" groups experiencing their first intensive contact with industrialism. Formal Marxism has not achieved a substantial following among American Negroes, but Marx would not be surprised at the rise of black militancy in recent years. As Southern Negroes move from the land to the cities, their rising material expectations collide with the frustrations of impersonal urban life. In many ways, the ghetto riots are recurrences of the blind old anarchist reaction that the Marxist vision tries to channel into another kind of political expression. Black Panther slogans have undergone an evolution typical of Marxist influences. The Panthers have not maintained a protest separation, resisting assimilation by the national state with anarchistic verve. In effect, their leaders express Marxist concepts, calling for a class struggle joining blacks and whites against "exploiters."

Less obvious but no less real is the analogy between 19th century Europe and the situation of modern
North Viet Always Ready To Accept Our Surrender

(KFS) When the late J. Robert Oppenheimer died

No Criticism Of The Invaders

Congratulations to Joe Wiesner for a well-put letter in this column protesting the biased terminology often used by the press in reporting the activities of Hanoi's chief adherents by referring to them as "antiwar" marchers. They're not anti-war where North Vietnam is concerned. It's time to call them what they are — anti-America.

bear largely because of THEIR encouraging the enemy with their subversive marches, vandalism and phony "peace" vigils here at home. Obviously they have no relatives over there needing protection.

South Vietnam Deserves Continued Aid From U.S.
Vietnam

News from May 1972

No Criticism Of The Invaders

Congratulations to Joe Wiesner for a well-put letter in this column protesting the biased terminology often used by the press in reporting the activities of Hanoi’s chief adherents by referring to them as “antiwar” marchers. They’re not anti-war where North Vietnam is concerned. It’s time to call them what they are — anti-America.

Not a word from these young vandals against the North Vietnam invaders who are at the core of prolonging the war. No criticism of the killing they bring to an invaded land they are out to ravage. Only criticism for the defenders.

They march and rant against “the bombing,” refusing to recognize the fact of its necessity, in part, to save the lives of American GIs as the President makes good his promise to withdraw our troops (some 500,000 to date), leaving the dwindling forces to be evacuated vulnerable to military pressures brought to bear largely because of THEIR encouraging the enemy with their subversive marches, vandalism and phony “peace” vigils here at home. Obviously they have no relatives over there needing protection.

An evil fifth column seems dedicated to spreading divisiveness throughout the land. Time, too, to put an end to their using our tax-supported grounds for spreading their pro-Hanoi propaganda. Such as the recent shameful encampment on the Municipal Building lawn, with its litter and unsightly signs. As one who helps pay the taxes to support that public part I protest its pollution in such brazen, anti-American fashion. Can anyone with a “cause,” or something to sell, simply appropriate acreage on our public building lands on the shallow pretext of the right-to-public assembly? At that rate every park and piece of city property could become forested with billboards, littered with hippie-type picnics conducted under the guise of “peace vigils”... by transients here who pay precious little in taxes (if any) and, through their vandalism, destroy more than they pay for.

* If such spectacles of pollution and subversion disturb you, don’t ask help from the mayor. Even if you strain your patience and the civic bureaucracy to reach him, it will do no good. I tried, and got nowhere. City Hall’s front lawn stayed poluted.

LEWIS H. CONARROE
1226 17th St.
Boulder, Colo

May 21, 1972
Boulder Daily Camera

Roy Ierna

Hanoi propaganda
-> in Boulder, Colo

This letter to the editor catches part of the spirit of 1972 in the USA.

- especially in a "liberal" town like Boulder, Colo.

One day we were even worried that there might be a march on NCAR — to destroy the computer.

- It was crazy.
- This did not happen. Cheek!
North Viet Always Ready To Accept Our Surrender

(KFS) When the late J. Robert Oppenheimer, who had argued against the scientific feasibility of an "H-Bomb," was asked his opinion of Edward Teller's breakthrough which made the bomb possible, he observed "it was beautiful." This was a clinical judgment, not an endorsement. A professional evaluation, not a plug for H-bombs.

In that same spirit, anyone with expert knowledge of the way Hanoi has used negotiations as a weapons system must admit: it has been beautiful. We have been played like salmon. The most recent negotiation capers were the defeasement of Sen. George McGovern and the appearance on the New York Times op-ed paged of a mournful little piece by a Labor Member of Parliament arguing that the National Liberation Front has offered "secret talks" in Paris which the U.S. has rejected. What is surprising is that the same techniques seem to work over and over again.

Take the "Tickler" as a case in point. From 1966 on, every time you looked around somebody was offering to mediate the war. In fact I worked up a scenario entitled "The Road to Hanoi." A self-nominated peacemaker would visit Hanoi (later Paris) and return with the news that the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) was really quite flexible, that President Johnson and Secretary Rusk were stonewalling, that the whole nasty business could be ended if we would just stop the bombing. Since we were in direct communication with Hanoi — Ambassador William Sullivan was right down the street from the DRV Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, for example — the question would be posed to Ho Chi Minh: "If we stop bombing, will you call off your invasion of South Vietnam?"

By JOHN P. ROCHE

From 1965 right down to last month, when they sandbagged George McGovern, the authoritative answer was "No. You must (1) cease bombing and all acts of war; and (2) bust the Saigon government." (A separate deal on prisoners of war was just another tickler.) In other words, real negotiations have never been on Hanoi's agenda; the DRV has been playing for total victory. And it has never hidden this fact — back in 1962, DRV Premier Pham Van Dong said as much to the late Bernard Fall: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars — and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win in the end."

In the light of this background let us look at the recent accusation of John Mendelson, M.P., in the Times.

"In preparation for my visit to Washington," he wrote, "I went to Paris (and) received definite information from sources within the Provisional Government of the South Vietnamese (the NLF) and that they had offered secret talks to the Americans on the subject of bringing the fighting to an end and on the setting up of a Government of National Well-Being" in Saigon. The United States delegation turned down this offer of secret negotiations.

Recalling that the NLF has flatly rejected a total cease-fire in Vietnam, which is surely the way to end the fighting, it is clear that Mr. Mendelson is back on Square One. The North Vietnamese have always been ready to accept our unconditional surrender — in public, in secret, in Esperanto, or demotic Greek. Indeed, back in 1967 one of their leaders observed jovially to a visitor that they would provide the music for the American retreat and throw flowers in the streets.

In any event, it has been "beautiful." We partly stopped the bombing and got talks about talks. We totally stopped the bombing and got negotiations about negotiations. But always Hanoi has insisted on our surrender as a precondition for "genuine negotiations." In short, if we withdraw and install a coalition-government in Saigon, the DRV equivalent of the Marine Band will see us off at the docks.

King Features Syndicate
Withdrawal Symptoms Evident in America

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON—The Senate has voted to cut U.S. military forces overseas, and that challenge to the present balance of power in the world has sent a shudder through the administration and the Western Alliance.

It is the paradoxical mood of defiance and retreat in the Senate—defiance of the President and retreat from world responsibilities—that troubles both the President and the allies.

For the moment, it is not a critical problem, for the House, despite some defections, is still willing to maintain for a while the present troop levels the United States has abroad. But even in the House many members who once backed the administration's force levels abroad are now wondering whether this is still necessary, and if so, for how long?

THE REASONS for this growing skepticism are varied. The President himself has proclaimed the Nixon Doctrine, limiting the nation's overseas commitments, and argued that his accommodations with Moscow and Peking have reduced world tensions and foreshadowed a "generation of peace." This has produced pressure on the Hill to cut the defense budget, reduce the U.S. garrisons abroad, and re-appraise or even eliminate foreign economic aid.

It was the central political argument of the administration during the last presidential campaign that the last four years have been an era of transition: from war to peace, from a wartime economy to a peacetime economy, from a federal budget dominated by defense to a budget dominated by social or human expenditures, from arms competition to arms limitation and from a draft-dominated military force toward an all-volunteer force.

This theme is now producing new voting patterns in Congress. Many Southerners, who were pugnaciously international and all for foreign aid a decade or so ago, now resent competition from abroad and are allying themselves with Northern liberals who used to be staunch supporters of internationalism, but who are now calling for vast transfers of funds from overseas to the problems of poverty and urban misery at home.

WHAT WE ARE SEEING in these congressional impulses to cut the defense budget, cut the troops abroad, cut the foreign aid, is also a reaction to the disappointments and tragedies of Vietnam. Withdrawal symptoms in a nation are even more painful than in an alcoholic or a drug addict, and the war has tended to encourage many members to withdraw not only from Vietnam but even from critical areas like Western Europe and Japan.

There is also a tendency here as a result of Watergate and its excessive use of presidential power, to oppose the White House, to dramatize the independence of the Congress, and to resent the Europeans and the Japanese for their competition with the dollar and American trade. All this is very understandable, and some of it is even sensible, but a substantial reduction in all U.S. forces overseas seems a bit steep.

The administration would probably be on sounder ground in meeting these extreme demands if it were not so extreme itself. The President has been threatening to veto any bill that doesn't match his estimate of what the defense budget should be, and veto any appropriation bill that he thinks is inflationary at home — and this has irritated the congressional leaders, and provoked Mike Mansfield, the majority leader in the Senate, who has wanted to cut overseas forces for years.

Somewhere in this debate, there has to be a compromise between the majority leader who wants nothing less than a large cut in the overseas forces and the administration that wants to keep force levels overseas where they are.
News from May 1972

May 21, 1972
Boulder Daily Camera
Boalder, Colo

-Roy Tenne

I kept some old news clippings
Now the paper is very yellow.
-R...noo

Now Aug 2006

- Vietnam -

Nobody's Bugging Out

But the US did bug out of Vietnam
The US did not honor its treaty promises
Reason: Congress cut the funds; A bad idea
-R...noo
South Vietnam Deserves Continued Aid From U.S.

WASHINGTON — One of the lesser priorities in most American’s thinking these days is what happens to South Vietnam. Most people want to forget that ordeal. But a struggle continues in Congress over whether the United States will keep its word and help the Saigon government remain strong.

Defense Secretary James Schlesinger was right when he said the United States is committed to send South Vietnam the tools of self-protection for one simple reason — because we said we would. The same point could be made about continued military assistance to Israel — we must do it because we promised we would.

Yet, it has become popular among some aspiring politicians in this town, Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), for one, to join the pro-Hanoi lobbying group against South Vietnam. Their line is that President Thieu’s government is corrupt, the war and the killing go on, there is brutality toward political prisoners and our support costs billions. Therefore, the United States should sharply cut, or eliminate, military and economic aid to Saigon.

The anti-Saigon lobbyists had fair success. The Nixon Administration asked for $1.6 billion military aid to South Vietnam for 1975. The House finally okayed $1.1 billion, and the Senate, which will soon vote on this question, considers a $900 million recommendation by its Armed Services Committee.

An Administration request for $775 million economic aid in 1974 was trimmed to $650 million. The Administration asks for $110 million in 1975.

The effort to cut funds for South Vietnam was carefully laid out last October by the “Indochina Peace Campaign,” representing 15 organizations and spurred by Tom Hayden, husband of Jane Fonda. Hayden had already met in Paris with officials of the Viet Cong provisional Revolutionary Government, thus suggesting a well-organized plan.

The October meeting ended with a “United Campaign to Pressure Congress,” and the view that “the antiwar movement has the objective capacity to actually force an end to U.S. aid to the Thieu and Lon Nol dictators.”

A “spring offensive” was promised, and it came in March when Jane Fonda and Hayden conducted an anti-South Vietnam meeting in a House Office Building conference room arranged for by Rep. Ronald Dellums (D-Calif.). Fonda and Hayden offered a course titled, “American Imperialism,” and discussion of “the totalitarian benefits of North Vietnam’s brand of communism.”

Fonda and Hayden toured the country, appearing on TV and radio “talk” shows and giving newspaper interviews about the old United States to anyone gullible enough to listen. Their rule was they would not allow guests on the programs to challenge their views. Indeed, they even appeared on Martin Agronsky’s “Evening Edition,” a Public Broadcast program from Washington, holding Agronsky to their rule.

Since President Nixon has lost such strength here, it is time for the mice to play and, on Capitol Hill, congressional staffers forget restraint. Sixty such staffers attended the Fonda-Hayden lectures.

Indeed John Ritch, a top staffer on Sen. J.W. Fulbright’s Foreign Relations Committee — which deals with Vietnam — gave a Sunday luncheon for Hayden and Fonda, which is his privilege, of course, but shows where his head is.

The reality of South Vietnam is that President Thieu, while not a democrat by American standards, is about as good as any ruler in Indochina, has held the country together and has an army which has successfully repulsed the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces.

The North Vietnamese are as wanton and ruthless as ever, killing village leaders, burning homes of resettled refugees (wonder why Sen. Kennedy never speaks to that?) and violating the Paris agreements.

Those appalled at the massacre of Israeli schoolchildren by Arab terrorists recently should also know that on March 9 North Vietnamese gunners fired mortars into a South Vietnamese grade school, killing 23 children and wounding 80 more. But who among Washington’s elite cares about that?

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger responded to Sen. Kennedy’s challenges on Indochina with a short letter and a long statement and was expected to do more this week before Congress. The gist of Kissinger’s argument is that the United States will continue to provide “material assistance and political encouragement” to the Indochinese governments so that they can determine their own futures.

Kissinger noted that casualties in South Vietnam have been substantially reduced since the 1973 cease-fire, but that “the fundamental problem is that the North Vietnamese are still determined to seize political power in the south using military means if necessary . . . (with) continued widespread terrorism against the population.”

(C) 1974, The L.A. Times
History of Russia, China, and Communism, 1917 – On

Roy Jenne
July 13, 2007
Rev Oct 8, 2007

My first trip to Russia was in 1971 (about the tropical Atlantic experiment, GATE). From 1979 – on, I led the US side of the annual bilateral data exchange meeting between the USSR/Russia – US. We exchanged data and worked together on projects. There are a number of online documents about the data. That stirs up an interest in history, too. Two “RJ Documents” about history follow:
RJ0247: The World Changes, 1989
   Big changes in Eastern Europe, later the USSR breaks apart in 1991.
RJ0260: Some History of Russia and Communism, 1917 – 1990

China. My first trip to China was in Dec 1980. We heard lots about the terrible Gang of Four. The years of the Cultural Revolution were awful. The schools were shut down for almost ten years. For a long time before and after Mao died, it was not clear whether the good guys (Deng) or the bad guys (Gang of 4) would win the struggle for power. Deng finally won. Cheers.
RJ0391: China: Growth, Bad 1960s, Old History, 04/2006
RJ0399: The Cultural Revolution in China (29 p)
RJ0414: China in the Era of Mao and Deng (32 p)
RJ0415: Secret Picture Archive of China Cultural Revolution (60 p). Please see this!
RJ0105/RJ0106: Climate Observations for US-China Data Exchange (191 p)

RJ0434 Cold War and Vietnam Information, 1945 – 1990 (57 p)
This document was ready to scan on Sep 25, 2007. It has:
  • Book, On the Brink, by Jay Winik. Important. (17 p here)
    - Mostly during the Reagan years.
    - About the people who won the Cold War.
  • Jeanne Kirkpatrick, neo-con, 1980s
    - The Blame America First crowd (~3 p)
  • US Victory in Vietnam: Lost and Found
    - Consequences of defeat in 1975.
    - Covers Tet Offensive in Jan – Feb 1968.
    - 2500 Vietnamese Boat People turned away by Malaysia.
    - 1.8 to 2.2 million killed in Cambodia.
  • Roosevelt and Truman years (5 p)
    - A problem with spies.
ANN COULTER

were there soviet spies in usa?

they had stated matter-of-factly that “few American Communists were spies.” The disgorging of decrypted Soviet cables forced the professors to revise that assessment.

The Soviet cables indisputably proved the guilt of all the left’s favorite “Red Scare” martyrs—Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Appropriately, the Soviet’s code name for Communist spy Julius Rosenberg was “Liberal.” Because of Venona, the FBI and certain top Justice Department officials were absolutely sure “they were prosecuting the right people.” But throughout the trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, J. Edgar Hoover risked acquittal rather than reveal that the U.S. had cracked the Soviet code. Without realizing that the U.S. government had confirmed the accounts of such informers as Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley with Soviet cables, the left smeared ex-Communist informers as lunatics and perverts. Now the world knew what J. Edgar Hoover knew at the time: The informers were telling the truth.

Bentley, long maligned the way liberals malign all women who cause them trouble, was known as the “Blonde Spy Queen.” Her testimony was roundly dismissed as “the imaginings of a neurotic spinster.” With flawless timing, just one year before the Venona Project was declassified, The Nation magazine sniffed that Bentley was “hardly a reliable informant.” (In 1994, the moral flaws of ex-Communist informants from the fifties were still a burning issue at The Nation.) The magazine called Bentley “an alcoholic who embraced both fascism and communism before she turned professional and converted to Catholicism.” Though Bentley named “nearly 150 people,” The Nation said, “the bureau never corroborated her story. It was inconsistent from the start and she kept adding names and details over the years.” So there you have it. After fifty years on the case, The Nation magazine could proclaim Bentley still a liar. In the definitive book about the decrypted cables, Venona, Haynes and Klehr state simply, “The deciphered Venona cables show that Elizabeth Bentley had told the truth.”

Here was the DNA evidence of Communist crimes during the Cold War. But for some reason, liberals did not brandish this evidence as
excitedly as they do newly discovered evidence allegedly “exonerating” murderers on death row. A lot of books, documentaries, articles, movies, and graduate student theses had already been deployed in the effort to portray an irrational hysteria that seized the nation about phantom Communists. The unveiling of Venona was as close to Judgment Day for liberals as we’ll ever get in this life.

The only indication that liberals have even heard of the Venona Project is that they haven’t been as prolix on the subject of innocent victims of anti-Communism lately. In moments of nostalgia, they will sometimes pretend they missed that day’s newspaper and impulsively attach the word “suspected” to the names of proved Soviet spies. But except for a few doddering Stalinists on college faculties and at The Nation magazine, it was: Game Over. The long, lachrymose tales of woe have disappeared. All liberals can hold on to now is the slogan “McCarthyism.” Just don’t ask for details.

After all the righteous indignation at the New York Times about “McCarthyism,” to say nothing of that paper’s vehement defense of Hiss, the Rosenbergs, Owen Lattimore—and for the record, Stalin, in the classic reportage of Walter Duranty—the Venona Project might have been at least as important as the July 2001 story on how, if you don’t count the military ballots, George Bush might have won Florida by only two hundred votes. But when the Venona Project was declassified, revealing decades of cable traffic between Soviet espionage agents and their American spies, it was barely noticed at the Times. Only about a dozen Times articles have ever mentioned the Venona Project even in passing. Not one article on Venona ever graced the front page or the op-ed page.11

The Times showed a rather more heightened interest in the release of internal documents from the House Un-American Activities Committee six years later. In a lengthy op-ed piece—something the Times never accorded the release of the Venona Project—Rick Perlstein complained that the unveiling of theHUAC documents “may have lacked the ceremony” of the declassification of Venona but was just as important nonetheless.12 The “ceremony” surrounding Venona’s
release had been a demure affair at the New York Times. No matter. The HUAC documents, Perlstein said, should “share its import.”

Heretofore we had heard only smears against the beloved Soviet Union. Now, at last, we would hear the other side in the battle of relatively equal evil forces: Soviet gulags and fascistic oppression by HUAC. Needless to say, there was nothing new in the HUAC documents and neither Perlstein nor anyone else ever mentioned them again.13 If Reagan hadn’t defeated the Soviet Union, thereby relieving liberals of their duty to defend Communist spies, they would refuse to acknowledge the existence of the Venona Project even now.

TO UNDERSTAND HOW DEEP WERE THE SOVIET TENTACLES IN the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, try to imagine a parallel universe today.

Paul Wolfowitz, Bush’s deputy secretary of defense, would be a member of al-Qaeda taking orders from Osama bin Laden.

*Alger Hiss, assistant to the secretary of state under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Identified as a Soviet spy in Venona.*14

The assistant to the secretary of the Treasury would be a member of al-Qaeda. He would be furiously employing a dozen other members of al-Qaeda at the Treasury Department. When their loyalty to America was questioned, he would leap in to defend them and save their jobs. With his secret al-Qaeda allies, he would intervene to block a crucial promised loan to Israel while at the same time encouraging the administration to make an absurdly generous loan to Saddam Hussein. When Israel imploded, historians and experts would rush in to say no one

*Trump defends and keeps Soviet agent*

*Despite repeated warnings from the head of the FBI that White was a Soviet agent, President Truman retained White at Treasury and then appointed him the top U.S. official at the International Monetary Fund.*
Soviet agents almost got control of US presidency.

Incredibly, if Roosevelt had died one year earlier, Stalin might have immediately gained control of the United States presidency, Treasury Department, and State Department. Soviet dupe Henry Wallace would have become president, and it is very possible that he would have made Soviet spy Harry Dexter White his Treasury secretary and Soviet spy Alger Hiss his secretary of state.

It was a huge conspiracy.

In a formulation that would make Harvard-educated traitors titter, Joe McCarthy called it “a conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. A conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its principals shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men.”

With a campaign of lies, liberals have turned McCarthy into the object “forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men.” Summarizing the views of all liberals, President Truman said, “I like old Joe. Joe is a decent fellow.” Not McCarthy, of course, but Stalin. Truman loathed Joe McCarthy.

Among the most notorious Soviet spies in high-level positions in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations—now proved absolutely, etc. — list of top Soviet agents

[Note:

The US had broken the Soviet cable code starting in the 1940s.

• The cables not declassified until July 11, 1995.

• Neither Roosevelt nor Truman were told about this project (it would have been leaked).]
The late senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan made a valiant effort
to defend Roosevelt’s and Truman’s maddening obtuseness to Soviet
agents in their employ, arguing that since they weren’t told of the
Venona Project, how could they be sure?

From 1945 to 1946, J. Edgar Hoover deluged Truman, the attor-
ney general, and the secretary of state with increasingly urgent memos
indicating that Harry Dexter White was a spy. The evidence was nei-
ther flimsy nor ambiguous. In 1945, the prime minister of Canada flew
to Washington to warn the director of the FBI about a spy who clearly
had to be White. A Soviet defector, Igor Gouzenko, had left the Soviet
embassy in Canada, bringing hundreds of pages of documents with
him. His information led to twenty-two arrests in Canada. Gouzenko’s
information identified White as a Soviet spy. Ex-spies Whittaker
Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley had also “independently and without
knowledge of each other’s stories” named White as a Soviet spy. In
the words of Sam Tanenhaus, biographer of Whittaker Chambers,
Hoover provided the Truman administration with “stark confirmation”
that Harry Dexter White (as well as Alger Hiss) was a Soviet agent.
Truman responded by making White the top U.S. representative at the
International Monetary Fund.

Just months into his presidency, Eisenhower would take the aston-
ishing step of directing his attorney general, Herbert Brownell, to go on
national TV and announce that President Truman had appointed a
Soviet spy to be the top U.S. official at the IMF with full knowledge
that White had been reliably identified as a Soviet agent. It was a
breathtaking revelation.

Truman responded to Brownell’s statement by indignantly
denying he had ever seen an FBI report suggesting that White was a
spy. The FBI then produced the report. Next, Truman said he had
moved White to the IMF only to get him out of the Treasury Depart-
ment, expecting the FBI to continue its surveillance of White. So put-
ing a Soviet spy in charge of the IMF was really a security measure.
At least there was a good explanation.

But Moynihan claimed that if only, Roosevelt and Truman had
been told about the precise mechanics of the Venona Project, perhaps
the Democrats would have finally expressed curiosity about the many
Soviet spies in their employ. More likely, the Democrats would have
told their Soviet pals that their cables were being read. In fact, that
actually happened.